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Abstract
How important are nancial friction shocks in business cycles uctuations? To answer this
question, I use micro data to quantify key features of U.S. rm nancing. I then construct a
dynamic equilibrium model that is consistent with these features and t the model to business
cycle data using Bayesian methods. In my micro data analysis, I nd that a substantial 35% of
rms' investment is funded using nancial markets. The dynamic model introduces price and
wage rigidities and a nancial intermediation shock into Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). According
to the estimated model, this shock explains 35% of GDP and 60% of investment volatility. The
estimation assigns such a large role to the nancial shock for two reasons: (i) the shock is closely
related to the interest rate spread, and this spread is strongly countercyclical and (ii) according
to the model, the response in consumption, investment, employment and asset prices to nancial
shocks resembles the behavior of these variables over the business cycle.
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2Is the nancial sector an important source of business cycle uctuations? My model analysis
suggests that the answer is `yes'. I nd that nancial sector shocks account for 35% and 60%
of output and investment volatility, respectively. These are the implications of a dynamic model
estimated using the past 20 years of data for the United States.
A key input into the analysis is a characterization of how important nancial markets are for
physical investment. To this end, I analyze the cash ow statements of all the U.S. public non-
nancial companies available in Compustat. I nd that 35% of the capital expenditures of these
rms is funded using nancial markets. Of this funding, around 75% is raised by issuing debt and
equity and 25% by liquidating existing assets. My analysis at quarterly frequencies suggests that
the nancial system is crucial in reconciling imbalances between the positive operating cash ows
and capital expenditures.
Shocks to nancial intermediation can promote or halt the transfer of resources to investing rms
and have large eects on capital accumulation and productive activity. To quantify the eects of such
shocks on the business cycle, I build a dynamic general equilibrium model with nancial frictions in
which entrepreneurs, like rms in the Compustat dataset, issue and trade nancial claims to fund
their investments. The model builds on Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), henceforth KM, and augments
their theoretical set-up with price and wage rigidities, and a nancial intermediation shock.
In my model, entrepreneurs are endowed with random heterogeneous technologies to accumulate
physical capital. Those entrepreneurs who receive better technologies issue nancial claims to in-
crease their investment capacity. Entrepreneurs with worse investment opportunities instead prefer
to buy nancial claims and lend to more ecient entrepreneurs, expecting higher rates of return
than those granted by their own technologies.
I introduce stylized nancial intermediaries (banks) that bear a cost to transfer resources from
entrepreneurs with poor capital accumulation technologies to investors with ecient capital pro-
duction skills. Banks buy nancial claims from investors and sell them to other entrepreneurs. In
doing so, perfectly competitive banks charge an intermediation spread to cover their costs (Chari,
Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995), Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Curdia and Woodford
(2010a)).1 I assume that these intermediation costs vary exogenously over time and interpret these
disturbances as nancial shocks. When the intermediation costs are higher, the demand for nancial
assets drops and so does their price. Consequently the cost of borrowing for investing entrepreneurs
rises. As a result, aggregate investment and output plunge.
I use Bayesian methods, as in Smets and Wouters (2007) and An and Schorfheide (2007) to
estimate a log-linearized version of the model bueted by a series of random disturbances, including
the nancial intermediation shock, on a sample of US macroeconomic time series that spans from
1989 to 2010. I include high-yield corporate bond spreads as one of the observables series to identify
the nancial shock (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011)). I choose priors for nancial parameters so that
1For a microfoundation of this friction based on Akerlof (1970)'s adverse selection argument, see Kurlat (2010).
3the model estimation can be consistent with Compustat evidence on corporate investment nancing
during the same sample period. The estimation results show that approximately 35% of the variance
of output and 60% of the variance of investment can be explained by nancial intermediation shocks.
The shock is also able to explain the dynamics of the real variables that shaped the last recession,
as well as the 1991 crisis and the boom of the 2000s.
Why is the nancial shock able to explain such a large fraction of business cycle dynamics? The
reason for this lies in the ability of my neo-Keynesian model to generate both booms and recessions
of a plausible magnitude and a positive co-movement among all of the real variables, including
consumption and investment, following a nancial intermediation shock. I nd that nominal rigidities
and in particular sticky wages (Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000)) are the key element in delivering
this desirable feature of the model. This is not a trivial result because in a simple frictionless model,
a nancial intermediation shock acts as an intertemporal wedge (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007) and Christiano and Davis (2006)) that aects investment, substituting present with future
consumption.
In my model there are two classes of agents: entrepreneurs who optimize their intertemporal
consumption prole by trading assets on nancial markets and building capital, and workers who
consume their labor income in every period. On the intertemporal margin, increased nancial inter-
mediation costs lower the real rate of return on nancial assets, discourage savings and investment
and induce entrepreneurs to consume more in the current period. Additionally, the shock induces
a drop in aggregate demand that translates into a downward shift in the demand for labor inputs.
When workers cannot re-optimize their wages freely, the decrease in labor demand translates into a
large drop in the equilibrium amount of hours worked. As a result, the wage bill falls and so does
workers' consumption. The drop in workers' consumption dominates over the rise in entrepreneurs'
consumption and the reduction in hours amplies the negative eect of the shock on aggregate
output.
Under exible wages, instead, aggregate consumption and investment move in opposite directions
in response to a nancial intermediation shock. I re-estimate the model without wage rigidities and
verify that nancial disturbances are in fact able to explain only 9.5% and 49% of output growth
and investment growth variance at business cycle frequencies, compared to 35% and 60% in the
benchmark sticky-wage case.
The estimation also allows me to quantify the role of the dierent structural shocks to output
dynamics during the Great Recession. Running counterfactual experiments on the estimated model
using the series of smoothed shocks, I nd that total factor productivity has increased during the
recession, as documented in Fernald (2009). The positive shocks to TFP helped reduce the drop
in output by 0.5% at the deepest point of the recession and increase the speed of the recovery.
Similarly, I nd that positive innovations in government spending reduced the size of the recession
by 1% of GDP at the trough. Public sector decits are benecial in the model, in the spirit of policy
4experiments in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011): when conditions on
nancial markets worsen, credit constrained entrepreneurs benet from holding an increasing stock
of government bonds (i.e. liquid assets) that help them self-insure against idiosyncratic risk.
This paper is related to the literature that explores and quanties the relations between nancial
imperfections and macroeconomic dynamics. A large part of the literature has focused on the ability
of nancial market frictions to amplify aggregate uctuations. In this tradition Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) rst analyzed the macroeconomic implications of the interaction of agency costs in credit
contracts and endogenous uctuations in the value of collateralizable assets, followed by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) who rst introduced similar frictions
in dynamic general equilibrium models.
Among research that explores the role of shocks that originate on nancial markets as pos-
sible drivers of cyclical uctuations, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) estimate a general
equilibrium model of the US and Euro Area economies, in which a nancial shock can hit in the
form of unexpected changes in the distribution of entrepreneurial net worth and riskiness of credit
contracts. They nd that this `risk' shock can account for approximately 30% of uctuations in
aggregate output. 2.
My model is close in its set-up to KM. They focus on nancial market transactions and on the
aggregate implications of a shock to the degree of liquidity of private assets. The liquidity shock
takes the form of a drop in the fraction of assets that can be liquidated to nance new investment
projects. Their model, where prices and wages are perfectly exible, has two unappealing features.
First of all, while, the KM liquidity shock does lead to a reduction in investment, consumption
instead rises on impact, and the negative eect on output is limited. As mentioned above, I nd that
introducing nominal rigidities and in particular sticky wages can correct this feature of the model.
Jerman and Quadrini (2011) also underline the importance of labor markets in the transmission
of nancial shocks by calibrating and then estimating a dynamic general equilibrium model where
rms issue debt and equity to nance both their investment and their working capital needs. In
their set-up, a nancial shock corresponds to a tightening of rms' borrowing constraints. If the
adjustment of equity nancing in substitution of debt is costly, reduced borrowing capacity in the
model translates into weaker labor demand and generates a recession.
A second unappealing feature of KM is that the primary impact of their liquidity shock on
the price of equity operates through a supply channel, under plausible calibrations of the model
parameters. By restricting the supply of nancial claims on the market, a negative liquidity shock
results in a rise in their price. Shi (2011) extends their model and documents this nding extensively,
questioning the ability of liquidity shocks to generate meaningful business cycle dynamics. To obtain
2Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011) conrm these ndings in the estimation of a small-open economy model
of the Swedish economy
5a positive co-movement of asset prices and output, I instead introduce random disturbances in the
nancial intermediation technology.
My modeling of these nancial intermediation shocks is inspired by work from Kurlat (2010) on
the macroeconomic amplication eects of adverse selection in trading of heterogeneous nancial
securities. He shows that an adverse selection friction in a model with heterogeneous assets maps
into a tax-wedge on nancial transactions in a framework with homogeneous securities similar to
KM. In my work, I translate this tax wedge into a nancial intermediation cost in the spirit of Chari,
Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995), Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Curdia and Woodford
(2010a). Moreover I assume the cost to be time-varying and subject to exogenous independent
shocks over time.
Another example of a model where nancial shocks originate within the nancial sector is Gertler
and Karadi (2011). In their model intermediaries are not subject to technology shocks but face
endogenous balance sheet constraints. They use a calibrated version of the model to evaluate the
eects of non-conventional monetary policies that can overcome intermediaries' lending restrictions.
To conclude, I briey compare my analysis with that of Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and
Kiyotaki (2010). They work with a liquidity shock modeled as in KM. An advantage of my interme-
diation shock is that it corresponds closely to an observed variable, namely, the interest rate spread.
In addition, Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010) focus is on the period of the recent
nancial turmoil and the associated monetary policy challenges. I study the past 20 years of data
using Bayesian estimation and model evaluation methods. In relation to Del Negro, Eggertsson,
Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010), my analysis conrms that nancial shocks were the driving force in
the recent recession. However, I also nd that these shocks have been important in the past 20 years.
The paper is structured so to oer an empirical description of corporate investment nancing from
the Compustat quarterly data in section 1. Section 2 describes the features of the model. Section
3 discusses the estimation strategy, the prior selection on the model parameters and signicant
moments. Section 4 presents the model estimation results and section 5 concludes.
1 Empirical Evidence on Investment Financing: the Compustat
Cash-Flow Data
This section of the paper is devoted to an empirical analysis of the degree of dependence of rms'
capital expenditures on nancial markets. My objective is to quantify the fraction of quarterly
corporate investment in physical capital that rms fund by accessing nancial markets as opposed to
using current operative cash ows. Here I also distinguish between the role of primary markets (debt
or equity nancing) and secondary markets (sales of old assets with dierent degrees of liquidity) as
sources of funds for capital expenditures and assess their relative importance at a quarterly level.
6For this purpose, I analyze cash ow data of U.S. rms. The Flow of Funds table for corpora-
tions (table F.102) reports a measure of nancial dependence of the corporate sector on transfer of
resources from other actors in the economy (e.g. households) dened as the Financing Gap. This
variable is computed as the dierence between internal funds generated by business operations in
the U.S. for the aggregate of rms, US Internal Fundst,
3 and total investment (or expenditure) on
physical capital, CAPXt :
4
Financing Gapt = FGt = US Internal Fundst   CAPXt: (1)
In a given quarter FGt is positive when the aggregate of U.S. corporations generate cash ows
from their business operations large enough to cover their capital expenditures and lend resources
to the rest of the economy. On the other hand, in a quarter when FGt is negative, the rms draw
resources from the rest of the economy to nance a fraction of their capital expenditures. This
aggregate measure however is not informative of the degree of dependence of single corporations on
nancial markets. Firms in decit are aggregated with rms in surplus and positive values for the
aggregate nancing gap can coexist with corporations with large decits at the micro-level.5
To avoid this aggregation problem and obtain a more accurate statistics on the degree of nan-
cial dependence of corporations, I build on work from Chari and Kehoe (2009) and rely on micro
evidence from Compustat.6 Compustat contains cash ow statement data both at annual and at
quarterly frequency for the universe of publicly traded North American companies. Quarterly data
are available from 1984, while a consistent break-down into their components is available since 1989.
I concentrate on the sample period that goes from 1989Q1 to 2010Q4. I focus on companies based
in the U.S. excluding Canadian corporations from the analysis.7 I focus on Compustat quarterly
3U.S. internal funds in a given quarter t are computed as corporate prots net of taxes, dividend payments and
capital depreciation:
US Internal Fundst = Protst   Taxt  Dividendst +K Depreciationt
4Data in the Flow of Funds tables reveal that non-nancial corporate xed investment is the largest component
of gross private domestic investment in the U.S. accounting for an average of 50% of the quarterly ow along the
period 1989:Q1 to 2010:Q1. Other components of gross private domestic investment are non-corporate non-residential
investment (21%), residential investment (27%) and changes in inventories (2%).
5In Flow of Funds data from 1952 to 2010 the average share of the Financing Gap out of total capital expenditures
for U.S. corporations amounts to 8%.
6Chari and Kehoe (2009) compute a rm-level measure of the annual nancing gap for all Compustat rms as the
dierence between operating cash ow, CFOt , and capital expenditures, CAPXt reported in each calendar year. They
then sum the nancing gaps over those rms that do not produce cash ows large enough to cover their investment
(CFOt   CAPXt < 0). Finally, they take the ratio of the absolute value of this sum and the total capital expenditure
for all the rms and report that from 1971 to 2009, an average of 16% of total corporate investment was funded using
nancial markets.
7Capital expenditures for the aggregate of U.S. Compustat corporations account for an average of 76% of quarterly
Flow of Funds U.S. corporate investment, around 50% of aggregate xed investment and 35% of aggregate investment
from 1989Q1 to 2010:Q1. Figure 1 and Table 1 in the appendix compare dynamic properties of level and growth rates
of capital expenditures in Compustat, CAPXt with those of aggregate investment, It and aggregate corporate capital
expenditures from the Flow of Funds table, FoF CAPXt. I nd that Capital Expenditures growth in Compustat
correlates well with aggregate Capital Expenditures growth from the Flow of Funds table for Corporations, despite
7cash ow data to quantify the extent of short-term cash-ow imbalances of the companies that are
not visible at annual frequencies. I start my analysis from the basic cash ow equality for a generic
rm e, within a quarter t:
CASHe;t = CF
O
e;t  
 
CFDe;t + CF
E
e;t
  CF Ie;t (2)
that states that the variation of liquid assets on the balance sheet of the rm ( CASHe;t) has to
equal the dierence between the operating cash ow generated by its business operations (CFOe;t) and
net cash receipts delivered to debt and equity holders (CFDe;t + CF
E
e;t), reduced by the amount of cash
used within the period to carry out net nancial or physical investments (CFIe;t): I redene investment
cash ow, CFIe;t = CAPXe;t+NFIe;t, as the sum of capital expenditures, CAPXe;t, and net nancial
investment, NFIe;t. Similarly, I decompose the cash ow to equity holders, CF
E
e;t = DIVe;t +CF
EO
e;t ,
into dividends (DIVe;t) and other equity net ows (CF
EO
e;t ), so that I can construct the rm-level
equivalent of the Flow of Funds denition of the nancing gap in (1) as:8
FGe;t =
 
CFOe;t  DIVe;t CAPXe;t
| {z }
Financing Gap Net of Dividends
= (CFDe;t + CF
EO
e;t )| {z }
External Sources
  (NFIe;t +CASHe;t)| {z }
Portfolio Liquidations
: (3)
If FGe;t > 0, then rm e reports a nancing surplus in period t: it is able to self-nance its
investment in physical capital and its dividend pay-outs, DIVe;t, and can use the additional resources
to buy back shares and/or pay back its debt obligations ( CFEOe;t + CF
D
e;t > 0). In addition, the rm
could use its surplus to increase the stock of nancial assets on its balance sheet and/or its cash
reserves (NFIe;t +  CASHe;t > 0).
If instead FGe;t < 0, the negative nancing gap in period t can be funded by relying on external
investors to subscribe new debt and/or equity securities (CFEOe;t + CF
D
e;t < 0), by liquidating assets
(NFIe;t < 0) and/or depleting deposits and cash-reserves (CASHe;t < 0).
In each quarter, I compute FGe;t for all rms in the dataset and identify those that show a
negative nancing gap. I then add the absolute value of these decits across the rms, to nd a
measure of the total nancing gap in each quarter t for the aggregate of Compustat rms:
FGTOTt =
X
e
jFGe;tj1 fFGe;t < 0g : (4)
I also recognize that a fraction of rms that report a negative nancing gap do so because they oc-
casionally post negative quarterly operating cash ows: rms that report CFOe;t < 0 access nancial
intermediaries and markets in general to fund part of their operating expenses (i.e. their working
showing a more pronounced volatility.
8Subtracting dividends from the operating cash ows allows me to be consistent with the denition of nancing
gap from the Flow of Funds tables in 1. Moreover evidence from the corporate nance literature points out that rms
treat dividends as a form of committed remuneration to their shareholders and as such not at their complete disposal
(Lintner (1956), Fama and Babiak (1968), Leary and Michaely (2011)).
8capital needs). Despite the relevance that working capital nancing may have in conditioning pro-
duction decisions and in driving the demand for nancial intermediation of rms, I choose to abstract
from it and to concentrate on nancial dependence that arises in connection to the accumulation of
physical capital only. Consequently, I subtract the absolute value of aggregate negative cash-ows
reported in every period, WKt, from the total nancing gap in (4) and dene the quarterly Financ-
ing Gap Share, FGSt, as the ratio of the nancing gap related to physical investment and the total
capital expenditure across all rms:
FGSt =
FGTOTt   jWKtj
CAPXt
=
FGTOTt  
P
e
CFOe;t1FGe;t < 0; CFOe;t < 0	P
eCAPXe;t
(5)
Table 2 in the appendix shows that from 1989Q1 and 2010Q1, the average of the nancing gap share,
FGSt, amounts to 35.45% of total investment, with a standard deviation of 4.74%:
9
FGS =
X
t
FGSt
T
= 35:45%
The share of capital expenditures that relies on funding from either primary or secondary markets
is substantial. Persistent shocks to the operating conditions on nancial markets can disrupt the
accumulation of aggregate capital and potentially aect the dynamics of output growth and be a
source of business cycle uctuations.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the seasonally adjusted Financing Gap Share dened in (5) (black
solid line in panel A) and its trend (black solid line in panel B) along the sample period 1989Q1 and
2010Q1.10
Panel B shows that reliance of capital expenditures on nancial markets features increasing trends
along the two economic expansions of the 1990s and in the 2000s. Moreover all three recessions start
with a sudden drop in the Financing Gap Share and loosely mark the beginning of prolonged periods
of decline in the variable that last well into the initial phase of following economic expansion. The
right-hand side of equation 3 suggests how corporations fund their Financing Gap. I use data in
9In the same table I report what fraction of the total nancing gap dened in (4) arises due to working capital
needs and is excluded from the denition of the Financing Gap Share in (5). I dene this ratio as the average over
time of the contribution of negative operating cash ows, CFOe;t, to the total nancing gap, FG
TOT
t ,in (4):
WKS =
1
T
X
t
WKt
FGTOTt
= 32:05%
and nd that around 32% of rms' total nancial dependence is connected to funding operating expenses.
Moreover, I report the Financing Gap Share statistics computed over annual and quarterly data using Chari and
Kehoe (2009)'s denition of nancing gap in (3). By direct comparison of their methodology with mine, I can compute
and report the share of total nancing gap that arises by treating dividends as an unavoidable commitment rather
than disposable resources. I nd that dividend payouts amount to around 26% of the total nancing gap in (4).
10Figure 5 reports the same results for all North American Compustat companies and compares it with an interpo-
lated version of the annual series from Chari and Kehoe (2009) (red dashed line) and with a series computed using
their methodology on quarterly data (blue dashed line). The three series are highly correlated, but the average level of
the quarterly data is larger, signaling an important role for the nancial sector in funding rms' short-term nancial
needs. All series are seasonally adjusted using the additive X12 Census model on Compustat quarterly data.
9Compustat to determine what fraction of the Financing Gap is funded using resources coming from
equity and/or debt holders, CFEOe;t and CF
D
e;t, and what fraction is instead nanced by liquidation of
assets on rms' balance sheets and/or depletion of cash reserves, NFIe;t+CASHe;t. In each quarter
t, debt and equity intakes account for a fraction, DESt, of the total nancing gap dened in equation
3:
DESt =
P
e(CF
D
e;t + CF
EO
e;t )1 fFGe;t < 0g
FGTOTt
(6)
On average, along the sample period debt and equity fund 75.67% of the total nancing gap (standard
deviation 22.45%):
1
T
X
t
DESt =
1
T
X
t
P
e(CF
D
e;t + CF
EO
e;t )1 fFGe;t < 0g
FGTOTt
= 75:67%
while the remaining 24.43% is covered by portfolio liquidations and changes in cash reserves, as
summarized in table 2.11
Figure 6 plots the share of the total nancing gap that is covered by portfolio liquidations and
variation in cash reserves, LIQSt, with LIQSt = 1   DESt:
LIQSt = 1 DESt =
P
e(NFIe;t +CASHe;t)1 fFGe;t < 0g
FGTOTt
(7)
The graph suggests that the relative importance of asset liquidations versus debt and equity intakes
is increasing in recessions. Recessions seem to be characterized mostly by a reduced inow of external
sources of nance per unit of investment undertaken (gure 6) and a shift towards asset liquidation
for the aggregate of U.S. corporations.
The data in gure 6 shows some important features. Positive realizations of the series represent
quarters when rms liquidate assets or deplete cash reserves. Negative realizations instead represent
episodes in which rms are able to borrow from the market not only to cover their nancing gap,
but also to acquire new nancial assets on secondary markets. This phenomenon is particularly
pronounced before the burst of the dotcom bubble at the end of the 90s, when the share of corporate
mergers and acquisitions had risen to 15% of US GDP in 1999 alone, compared to an average of 4%
during the 1980s, (Weston and Weaver (2004)). Another important characteristic of the data series
is the dierence in the relevance of portfolio liquidations in the 2000s, compared to the 1990s. The
average fraction of nancing gap covered through asset liquidations is lower along the expansion of
the 1990s (average contribution amounts to 19.74% of Financing Gap from 1991 to 2001), and higher
in the boom of the 2000s (34.27% from 2002 to 2008).
11Variantions in cash reserves amount alone to 20.74% of the total nancial gap.
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2 The Model
In this section I describe a model that can capture the features of rms' investment nancing in
the Compustat quarterly data. In the model described in this section entrepreneurs: 1) produce
enough resources on aggregate to fund total investment, 2) singularly issue and trade nancial claims
through a competitive banking sector, to raise funds to nance their capital expenditures and, 3)
trade and hold liquid assets as precautionary savings against idiosyncratic investment opportunity,
in line with rm-level data in Compustat.
The economy described below consists of a unit measure of entrepreneurs and a unit measure of
households, perfectly competitive nancial intermediaries (banks),competitive producers of a homo-
geneous consumption good, intermediate goods producers who act in regime of imperfect competi-
tion, capital producers who transform nal goods into ready-to-install capital goods, households that
supply dierentiated labor inputs combined in homogeneous work hours by employment agencies.
The government is composed of a monetary authority and a scal authority.
2.1 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are indexed by e. They own the capital stock of the economy, Kt. In each period they
receive an idiosyncratic technological shock to install new capital. After observing their technology
level, they can decide to increase their capital stock if they receive a good technology draw. To
increase their investment capacity and take advantage of their technology, they can borrow resources
by issuing and selling equity claims (Ne;t) on their physical assets (Ke;t) to nancial intermediaries.
Alternatively, if their technology is inecient, they can decide to forgo investment opportunities
that are not remunerative and instead lend resources to more ecient entrepreneurs in exchange for
the rate of return on the new capital produced. Entrepreneurs can also accumulate liquid assets in
the form of government bonds (Be;t).
At the beginning of the period a snapshot of each entrepreneur's balance sheet will include his
capital stock, Ke;t 1, the equity claims on other entrepreneurs' capital stock, Notherse;t 1 and interest
bearing government bond holdings, RBt 1Be;t 1 on the assets side. On the liability side, entrepreneurs
sell claims on their capital stock to others, so that part of their Ke;t 1 is backed by N solde;t 1:
A L
QtKe;t 1 QtN solde;t 1
QtN
others
e;t 1
RBt 1Be;t 1 Net Worth
Assuming that each unit of equity in the economy, Nt, represents one unit of homogeneous capital,
Kt, so that the two assets share the same expected stream of returns,

RKt+i
	
for i = f0; :::;1g, it is
11
possible to dene a unique state variable that describes the net amount of capital ownership claims
held by entrepreneur e:
Ne;t = Ke;t +N
others
e;t  N solde;t
Entrepreneur e maximizes his life-time utility of consumption:
maxEt
1X
s=0
sbt+s log(Ce;t+s) (8)
subject to a ow of funds constraint:
PtCe;t+s + P
K
t+sie;t+s +Q
B
t+sN
+
e;t+s  QAt+sN e;t+s + Pt+sBe;t+s = (9)
1  k

RKt+sNe;t+s 1 +R
B
t+s 1Be;t+s 1
The entrepreneur receives after-tax income from his assets at the beginning of the period (the right-
hand side of (9)) and uses it to purchase consumption goods, Ct, at price Pt from nal goods
producers or capital goods ie;t, at price P
K
t from capital goods producers. The entrepreneur can
also purchase equity claims N+e;t at price Q
B
t from banks and government bonds at price Pt from
the scal authority. Some entrepreneurs may decide to sell equity claims N e;t at a price QAt to
banks.12
An entrepreneur can increase his equity stock by purchasing and installing capital goods ie;t
by means of the technology Ae;t, where Ae;t  U

Alow; Ahigh

.13 He can also increase his assets
by purchasing new equity claims from nancial markets N+e;t, or decrease them by selling equity
claims, N e;t. The law of motion of the equity stock for entrepreneur e will be:
Ne;t+s = Ae;t+sie;t+s +N
+
e;t+s  N e;t+s + (1  )Ne;t+s 1. (10)
Entrepreneurs are constrained in the amount of nancial claims that they can issue and sell on the
market, as in KM. Those who decide to purchase and install capital goods can write claims just on a
fraction Ae;tie;t of their new capital stock and sell it to banks to raise external nancing. Similarly,
entrepreneurs with good technologies can only sell a share  (1  )Ne;s+t 1 of old equity units to
nance the installation of new ones.14 Equity sales, N e;t+s will then have to satisfy the constraint:
N e;t+s  Ae;t+sie;t+s +  (1  )Ne;s+t 1. (11)
12For now I am assuming that QAt  QBt , so that no arbitrage opportunity exists for entrepreneurs on the equity
market. This will be derived as an equilibrium result when discussing the role of nancial intermediaries in section 2.2.
13Assuming that idiosyncratic technologies are uniformly distributed helps with aggregation of optimality conditions
across entrepreneurs.
14KM suggest that constraints on new equity issuances, , may arise when investment requires a (non-collateralizable)
eort of the entrepreneurs to be put in place, as in Hart and Moore (1994). Similarly constraints on the ability to
resell old assets, , can be justied assuming a certain degree of specicity of installed capital, or to the presence of
reallocation costs (Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006)).
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so they do not exceed the sum of the external nance limit, Ae;t+sie;t+s, and the maximum amount
of resalable equity,  (1  )Ne;s+t 1.
Note nally that entrepreneurs' discount factor in (8), sbt, is subject to an intertemporal pref-
erence exogenous shock that follows the AR(1) process:
log bt = b log bt 1 + "
b
t
where "bt  i.i.d. N
 
0; 2b

.
To sum up, entrepreneurs maximize (8), subject to (9), (10) and (11) and under the non-
negativity constraints:
ie;t+s  0; N+e;t+s  0; N e;t+s  0; Be;t+s  0 (12)
The problem can be solved at time t+ s for the optimal levels of: fCe;t+s, ie;t+s,  N+e;t+s,  N e;t+s,
Ne;t+s, Be;t+sg, given a set of prices and rates of return: fPt, PKt , QBt+s, QAt+s, RKt+s, RBt+sg, a draw
of the installation technology Ae;t+s, a portfolio of assets Ne;t+s 1,Be;t+s 1 at the start of the period
and a realization of the aggregate shocks.
New capital and old equity units share the same resale and purchase prices, QAt and Q
B
t , and
return prole in the future,RKt+ig for i = f0; :::;1g. Entrepreneurs will then always treat them as
perfect substitutes. Following Kurlat (2010), at the beginning of the period an entrepreneur observes
the price at which he can sell nancial claims to a bank, QAt+s, the one at which he can buy nancial
claims from the bank QBt+s, and the level of his installation technology, A
e
t . Entrepreneurs compare
their own relative price of capital goods,
PKt
Aet
, with the resale and purchase prices of equity claims,
QAt  QBt (g. 7). Depending on his random technology draw, an entrepreneur can becomes a Seller
and optimally decide to buy capital goods at price PKt and install them by means of his technology
Aet , while selling claims to nancial intermediaries at price Q
A
t . Alternatively, he can become a
Keeper and install capital goods using his own technology and income, or become a Buyer, forgoing
installation of capital goods and buying claims on the capital stock of other entrepreneurs paying
QBt for each nancial claim.
Figure 7 shows the partition into the three subsets: Sellers, Keepers and Buyers, depending on
the random draw of installation technology for the period. In particular:
 SELLERS (index e = s): PKtAs;t  QAt
Sellers can take advantage of good technology draws. Their relative price of a unit of installed
capital,
PKt
Ai;t
, is lower than the real price at which the entrepreneur can issue new equity claims or sell
old ones, QAt , and lower than the price at which he can buy nancial claims on other people's capital
stock, QBt . The entrepreneur can then prot from building new physical assets at a relative price
PKt
Ai;t
and selling equity claims to the nancial intermediaries at price QAt . The optimal decision then
13
implies that the entrepreneur sells the intermediaries the highest amount of equity claims possible,
from 11:
N s;t = As;tis;t +  (1  )Ns;t 1 (13)
and avoids buying assets from the market, so that N+s;t = 0 In analogy with KM, in steady state
entrepreneurs with a good technology will cash their returns on liquid assets but will not accumulate
new ones, Bt = 0,. I solve the model assuming that the economy does not depart from this allocation.
Substituting (13), as well as N+s;t = 0 and Bt = 0 into (9), Sellers' real budget constraint becomes
Cs;t + ~q
A
s;tNs;t =
 
1  K rKt Ns;t 1 + rBt Bs;t 1 + qAt + ~qAs;t (1  ) (1  )Ns;t 1 (14)
with:
~qAs;t =
pKt
As;t
  qAt
1  
and real asset prices and rates of return dened as qAt = Q
A
t /Pt, p
K
t = P
K
t /Pt, r
K
t = R
K
t /Pt and
rBt = R
B
t /Pt. The right-hand-side of (14) is the net worth of a generic seller, s. Finally, given the
distribution of technologies, Ae;t, across entrepreneurs, the measure of sellers in the economy is:
s;t = Pr

PKt
Ae;t
 QAt

 KEEPERS (index e = k): QAt  P
K
t
Ak;t
 QBt
The relative price of a unit of installed capital,
Pkt
Ak;t
, is higher than what the market maker pays for
each equity claim sold or issued, QAt , but lower than the price at which entrepreneurs can acquire
new equity from others, QBt . As a result, these entrepreneurs will not issue new claims nor sell their
assets:
N k;t = 0
nor will they buy nancial assets:
N+k;t = 0, Bk;t = 0
so that their budget constraint (9) in real terms becomes:
Ce;t +
pKt
Ak;t+s
Nk;t =
 
1  K rKt Nk;t 1 + rBt Bk;t 1 + pKtAk;t (1  )Nk;t 1 (15)
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The measure of keepers in the economy is:
k;t = Pr

QAt 
P kt
Ae;t
 QBt

 BUYERS (index e = b): PKtAb;t  QBt
Buyers receive poor investment technology draws. The relative price of a unit of installed capital,
PKt
As;t
, is higher than both the market price of equity QBt and of the amount obtained from market
makers for each units of equity sold or issued, QAt . These entrepreneurs will decide not to install
new physical capital. They will instead acquire nancial claims at their market price QBt . Similarly
to KM, Buyers will accumulate government bonds, Bb;t in non-arbitrage with equity claims. They
acquire these liquid assets to self-insure against the arrival of good technology draws in the future,
so to overcome their binding borrowing and liquidity constraints. Their budget constraint in real
terms will then become:
Cb;t + q
B
t Nb;t +Bb;t =
 
1  K rKt Nb;t 1 + rBt+sBb;t 1 + qBt (1  )Nb;t 1 (16)
where:
qBt =
QBt
Pt
Finally, the fraction of buyers in the economy will be:
b;t = Pr

PKt
Ab;t
 QBt

= 1  s;t   k;t
The three budget constraints (14), (15), (16) now display entrepreneurs' net worth on their
right-hand side. By properties of the log-utility function, optimal consumption in period t is a xed
fraction (1  bt) of the entrepreneur's net worth. 15
2.2 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries (or banks) manage the transfer of resources between Sellers and Buyers of
nancial claims.
In each period, a multitude of intermediaries indexed by i compete to acquire equity claims,
N i;t, at price Q
A
t and sell the quantity N
+
i;t to Buyers at a price Q
B
t . To do this, they bear
15An on-line technical appendix presents the complete set of optimality conditions of the entrepreneurs' prob-
lem, under the assumption that the installation technology Ae;t follows a Uniform distribution U

Alo; Ahi

. This
assumptions allows me to derive a closed form aggregate expression for the optimal amount of investment car-
ried out by sellers. The same appendix contains the derivation of the set of equilibrium conditions of the model
and the complete denition of the equilibrium for the model economy. The appendix will be soon available at:
https://sites.google.com/site/ajelloandrea/.
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an intermediation cost equal to  tQ
A
t for each nancial claim they process. Banks maximize their
nominal prots:
IIt = Q
B
t N
+
i;t   (1 +  qt )QAt N i;t (17)
subject to the constraint that the number of claims they buy is the same as the one they sell:
N+i;t = N
 
i;t. (18)
Perfect competition among intermediaries implies that prots are maximized when:
qBt = (1 + 
q
t ) q
A
t .
The real `bid' price, qBt =
QBt
Pt
, oered to buyers, is equal to the `ask' price, qAt =
QAt
Pt
, augmented by
an intermediation cost (or spread),  qt .
Sellers and Buyers share the incidence of the intermediation cost. An increase in the cost reduces
the expected return on savings to the Buyers. At the same time, it lowers the amount of resources
that are transferred to investing entrepreneurs for each unit of equity sold. The price of equity claims
sold by investing entrepreneurs, qAt , falls and their cost of borrowing rises. The immediate result of
the negative shock on  qt is that investment drops with potential eects on output and consumption
dynamics, discussed at length in section 4.
In the literature, see Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995), Goodfriend and McCallum
(2007) and Curdia and Woodford (2010b) introduce wedges similar to the one proposed here to
model nancial market imperfections and the evolution of credit spreads. Work by Kurlat (2010)
shows that an adverse selection friction in a model with lemon and non-lemon assets is isomorphic
to a model with homogeneous equity claims in which nancial transactions are hit by a tax wedge,
as discussed in this paper. In his formulation, the wedge is a reduced form representation of the
share of lemon claims over total claims traded on the market.16
In Kurlat's model, this wedge evolves endogenously and depends positively on the share of lemons
traded in every period and the proceeds from the tax are rebated to the government. The wedge
generates a spread between the expected cost of borrowing perceived by Sellers and the expected
16In a set-up with heterogeneous equity claims, some assets are of good quality while others can be lemons and
Sellers can possess private information on the quality of their assets and on the their future payos. Buyer cannot
distinguish the two before a transaction with a Seller is nalized. Kurlat (2010) follows Akerlof (1970) and shows that,
in a dynamic general equilibrium model similar in avor to KM, sales of good quality assets is pro-cyclical and respond
to aggregate shocks. After a persistent negative productivity shock, for example, current and future returns on capital
decrease, aggregate savings are reduced and the price of nancial assets plummets. This induces entrepreneurs who
wish to nance their investment opportunities to hold onto their good quality assets, waiting for better opportunities in
the future. Lemons are worthless and sellers always have an incentive to place them on the market at any price. After
a negative technology shock the, the composition of asset quality on nancial market worsens and this increases the
adverse selection problem: the higher probability of purchasing a lemon asset on the market will drive buyers demand
for nancial claims even lower, generating an amplication eect on the drop of the asset price and on the value of net
worth of entrepreneurs in the economy.
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return on savings perceived by Buyers.
In my model, I assume that this tax wedge maps into a cost that nancial intermediaries bear for
each unit of nancial claims that they transfer from Sellers to Buyers. The total amount of resources
that banks spend to purchase a unit of nancial claims from Sellers is then equal to (1 +  qt ) q
A
t . To
evaluate the role of nancial disturbances as potential drivers of business cycles that are orthogonal
to other sources of business uctuation, I assume that the intermediation costs  t follow an exogenous
process of the kind:
log (1 +  qt ) = (1   ) log (1 +  q) +  log
 
1 +  qt 1

+ "t
where "t  N
 
0; 2

.
2.3 Final Good Producers
At each time t, competitive rms operate to produce a homogeneous consumption good, Yt, as a
combination of dierentiated intermediate good, Yt(i), through the technology:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (i)
1
1+p;t di
1+p;t
(19)
where p;t is the degree of substitutability between the dierentiated inputs. The log of p;t follows
an ARMA(1,1) exogenous process:
log (1 + p;t) =
 
1  p

log (1 + p) + p log (1 + p;t 1) + "
p
t + p"
p
t 1 (20)
with "pt  N

0; 2p

, as in Smets and Wouters (2005).
Standard prot maximization of the nal good producers and their zero prot condition deter-
mine the price of the nal good, Pt, as a CES aggregator of the prices of the intermediate goods,
Pt (i):
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (i)
1
p;t di
p;t
and the demand for intermediate good i as:
Yt (i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
  1+p;t
p;t
Yt (21)
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2.4 Intermediate Goods Producers
Firms in regime of monopoly use capital and labor inputs, Kt 1(i) and Lt(i), to produce dierentiated
intermediate goods, Yt(i), using the following technology:
Yt(i) = max
n
A1 t Kt 1 (i)
 Lt (i)
1   AtF ; 0
o
(22)
At represents non-stationary labor-augmenting technological progress. The growth rate of At follows
an exogenous AR(1) process:
log

At
At 1

= log (zt) = (1  z) log () + z log (zt 1) + "zt (23)
where  is the steady-state growth rate of output in the economy and "zt  N (0; z). Finally, AtF
is a xed cost indexed by At that equalizes average prots across the measure of rms to zero in
steady state (Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)).
Firms employ homogeneous labor inputs, Lt (i), from households at a nominal wage rate Wt
and rent the capital stock, Kt 1 (i), from entrepreneurs at a competitive rate RKt . Firms minimize
their costs and maximize their monopolistic prots, knowing that in period t they will only be able
to re-optimize their prices with probability 1   p. The remaining fraction of rms that do not
re-optimize, p, are assumed to update their prices according to the indexation rule:
Pt (i) = Pt 1 (i)
p
t 1
1 p
where t =
Pt
Pt 1 is the gross rate of ination and  is its steady state value (Calvo (1983)).
Those rms who can choose their price level will then set Pt (i) optimally by maximizing the
present discounted value of their ow of prots:
Et
1X
s=0
sp
swt+s
8<:
24Pt (i)
0@ sY
j=0

p
t 1+j
1 p
1A35Yt+s (i)  hWtLt (i) +RktKt (i)i
9=; (24)
subject to the demand function for good Y (i), (21), and to the production function (22).Households
own shares of the intermediate rms: current and future prots (24) are evaluated according to the
marginal utility of a representative household, wt .
2.5 Capital Goods Producers
Capital goods producers operate in regime of perfect competition and on a national market. Pro-
ducers purchase consumption goods from the nal goods market, Y It at a price Pt, transforms them
18
into investment goods, It, by means of a linear technology:
It = Y
I
t .
Producers then have access to a capital production technology to produce it units of capital goods
for an amount It of investment goods:
it =

1  S

It
It 1

It
where S () is a convex function in ItIt 1 , with S = 0 and S0 = 0 and S00 > 0 in steady state (Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)). Producers sell capital goods to the entrepreneurs on a competitive
market at a price P kt . In every period they choose the optimal amount of inputs, It as to maximize
their prots:
max
It+s
Et
1X
s=0
sEt+s
n
wt+s
h
P kt+sit+s   Pt+sIt+s
io
(25)
s.t.
it+s =

1  S

It+s
It+s 1

It+s. (26)
I assume that the households own stocks in the capital producers, so that the stream of their
future prots is weighted by their marginal utility of consumption, wt+s : Free entry on the capital
goods producing sector requires prots to be zero in equilibrium, so that the value of capital goods
sold in every period t across all capital producers has to be equal to the nominal value of aggregate
investment:
P kt it = PtIt
2.6 Employment Agencies
The economy is populated by a unit measure of households, indexed by w, who consume and supply
a dierentiated labor force to employment agencies. A large number of such agencies combines the
dierentiated labor into a homogeneous labor input Lt, by means of the Dixit-Stiglitz technology:
Lt =
Z 1
0
Lw;t
1
1+w;t dw
1+w;t
where w;t is the degree of substitutability of specialized labor inputs, Lw;t and the desired mark-up
of the wage over the marginal disutility of labor required by the specialized household. I assume
that the mark-up evolves according to an exogenous ARMA(1,1) process:
log (1 + w;t) = (1  w) log (1 + w) + w log (1 + w;t 1) + "wt + p"wt 1 (27)
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with "wt  N
 
0; 2w

.
Agencies hire specialized labor, Lw;t at monopolistic wages,Ww;t, and provide homogeneous work
hours, Lt, to the intermediate producers, in exchange for a nominal wage, Wt. Similarly to the good
production technology, prot maximization delivers a conditional demand for labor input for each
employment agency equal to:
Lw;t =

Ww;t
Wt
  1+w;t
w;t
Lt
The nominal wage paid by the intermediate rms to the employment agencies is an aggregate of the
dierent specialized salaries Ww;t:
Wt =
Z 1
0
W
1
w;t
w;t dz
w;t
2.7 Households
Households maximize their lifetime utility of consumption, Cw;t:
1X
s=0
s

log (Cw;t+s   hCw;t+s 1)  !Lw;t+s
1+v
1 + v

(28)
subject to their nominal budget constraint:
PtCw;t+Q
B
t N
+
w;t QAt N w;t+Bw;t = (1  L)Ww;tLw;t+RKt Nw;t 1+RBt 1Bw;t 1+Tt+Qw;t+t
(29)
and to limited participation constraints on nancial markets: Bw;t = 0, N
+
w;t = 0 and N
 
w;t = 0.
Workers do not borrow or accumulate assets in equilibrium.17 As a result, in a generic time t nominal
consumption PtCw;t is nanced by labor earnings, Ww;tLw;t, net of distortionary taxes 
LWw;tLw;t
and lump-sum transfers, Tt, and prots earned from ownership of intermediate rms, banks and
17 Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) derive this as an equilibrium result of their model that holds as long as, in a liquidity-
constrained dynamic equilibrium, the expected rate of return on nancial assets is lower than the intertemporal
rate of substitutions of households. The fact that all households do not save in equilibrium and cannot borrow on
nancial markets is a rather extreme implication, in a model economy in which labor inputs traditionally receive
around 60% of total output as remuneration. Empirical work on life-cycle consumption dynamics does suggest that
a signicant 20% share of people in the US economy live hand-to-mouth existences (Gourinchas and Parker (2002),
Hurst and Willen (2007)). In practice it is possible to allow for a certain degree of savings at the household level,
by introducing idiosyncratic shocks and borrowing constraints, similar to the random investment opportunities that
occur along entrepreneurs' life cycle. Random health expenses (Kiyotaki and Moore (2005)) or unexpected taxation
shocks (Woodford (1990)) could in practice create an incentive in favor of households' precautionary saving behavior.
Alternatively it is possible to introduce aggregate savings at the households' level by allowing them to trade separately
on long-term government bonds, at yields higher than the risk-free rate. This form of bond market segmentation
would introduce a simple term structure of government bond yields whose upward slope is sustained by entrepreneur's
demand for liquid short-term bonds. To keep the model tractable, in this paper I choose to restrict households' ability
to trade resources on the intertemporal margin.
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capital producers, t. The budget constraint of the household becomes:
PtCw;t =
 
1  LWw;tLw;t + Tt +Qw;t +t
In every period only a fraction (1  w) of workers re-optimizes the nominal wage. To make
aggregation simple, I assume that workers are able to insure themselves against negative realizations
of their labor income that occur in each period t, by trading claims Qw;t with other workers before
they are called to re-optimize Ww;t.
The wage is set monopolistically by each household as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000): a
fraction (1  w) of workers supplies labor monopolistically and sets Ww;t by maximizing:
Et
1X
s=0
t+sw 
t+s

  !
1 + 
Lw;t+s
1+

subject to the labor demand of the employment agencies:
Lw;t+s =

Ww;t
Wt
  1+w;t
w;t
Lt
The remaining fraction w is assumed to index their wages Ww;t in every period according to a rule:
Ww;t =Ww;t 1
 
t 1ezt 1
w
(e)1 w
that describe their evolution as a geometric average of past and steady state values of ination and
labor productivity.
2.8 Monetary Authority
The central bank sets the level of the nominal interest rate, RBt , according to a Taylor-type rule of
the kind:
RBt
RB
=
 
RBt 1
RB
!R  t

1 R Xt s

Y
mp;t (30)
where the nominal risk free rate depends on its lagged realization and responds to deviations of a
4-period trailing ination index t =
X3
s=0
t s
4 from steady state ination, , as well as to the
deviations of the average growth rate of GDP, Xt = Ct + It + Gt, in the previous year Xt s =X3
s=0
logXt s logXt s 1
4 from its steady state value . Moreover, mp;t represents an i.i.d. monetary
policy shock:
log mp;t = "mp;t
where "mp;t is i.i.d. N
 
0; 2mp

.
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2.9 Fiscal Authority
The scal authority issues debt, Bt and collects distortionary taxes on labor income and capital
rents, kRktKt 1 and  lWtLt to nance a stream of public expenditures, Gt, lump-sum transfers to
households, Tt, and interest payments on the stock of debt that has come to maturity, R
B
t 1Bt 1:
Bt + 
kRktKt 1 + 
lWtLt = R
B
t 1Bt 1 +Gt + Tt.
Following the DSGE empirical literature, the share of government spending over total output
follows an exogenous process:
Gt =

1  1
gt

Yt
where:
log gt = (1  g) gss + g log gt 1 + "gt
and "gt  i.i.d.N
 
0; g2

.
My model requires an empirically plausible description of the dynamics of the supply of liquid
assets that originates from the public authority. I then follow Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) in
their empirical work on the dynamics of scal nancing in a DSGE model of the US economy.18 To
obtain a scal rule that resembles the one in the de-trended model in Leeper, Plante, and Traum
(2010) as closely as possible, I assume the share of transfers over total output, Tt=Yt, to depart from
its steady state value, ToY , in response to deviations of the average growth rate of output in the
past quarter from the stable growth path as well as to deviations of the debt to output ratio BtYt from
a specic target, BoY :19
Tt=Yt
ToY
=

Yt

 'Y Bt=Yt
BoY
 'B
Transfers then increase when output growth falls below its steady state value. On the other hand,
transfers fall when Bt=Yt increases over its steady state level, as to keep the stock of public debt
stationary.
Notice also that the description of the public provision of liquid assets in the form of government
bonds assumes a key role in this model. Fiscal policy is non-Ricardian (as in Woodford (1990)):
dierent agents accumulate government bonds than those who bear the burden of taxation. Workers
do not save, so that they are not able to smooth out the impact of their scal contribution and
entitlements along time. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, do not save for tax-smoothing purposes.
They instead accumulate government bonds to self-insure against the arrival of good investments in
the future and overcome their borrowing and liquidity constraints described in section 2.1.
18Dierently from Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010), I do not allow for taxation on nal consumption and do not
include correlation among the stochastic components of the scal rules.
19The latter feature insures that scal policy is passive, so that it does not conict with the central bank's Taylor
rule in the determination of a unique stable path for the growth rate of the price level (Woodford (2003)).
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2.10 Aggregation, Market Clearing and Model Solution
Aggregation across entrepreneurs is made easy by the log-preferences assumption and by the inde-
pendence of the realizations of installation technology idiosyncratic shocks, Ae;t, with the amount of
capital and nancial assets that agents enter the period with, Ne;t 1 and Be;t 1. Log-utility implies
linearity of their consumption, investment and portfolio decisions with respect to the state variables,
Nt 1 and Bt 1. Summing over the individual ow of funds constraints, output at time t, Yt, is
absorbed by consumption of sellers (S), keepers (K), buyers (B) and workers (W), by investment
and government spending and nancial intermediation costs:
Yt =
Z
S
Cs;tf(Ae;t)ds+
Z
K
Ck;tf(Ae;t)dk +
Z
B
Cb;tf(Ae;t)db+ C
W
t + It +Gt +  tq
A
t Nt
= Ct + It +Gt +  tq
A
t Nt
where GDP is instead dened as:
Xt = Ct + It +Gt
To solve the model, I rst rewrite its equilibrium conditions in stationary terms, rescaling such
variables as output and GDP, Yt, Xt, consumption, Ct, investment, It, capital and equity, Kt and
Nt and real wages,
Wt
Pt
, that inherit the unit root of the total factor productivity stochastic process,
At. I then compute the steady state of the model in terms of stationary variables and nd a log-
linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions around it. I then solve the system of rational
expectation equations to obtain the model's state-space representation.
3 Estimation
In this section I describe the estimation of the model in section 2 on U.S. data using Bayesian
methods. I start with a description of the data and of the choice of prior distributions for the model
parameters and for certain moments, based on previous work in the DSGE estimation literature and
on the micro-data evidence from Compustat reported in section 1. I here discuss the estimates and
the features of the impulse response functions to the nancial intermediation shock, the model t and
the variance decomposition of the observables in the fundamental shocks implied by the estimation. I
nally present the historical decomposition of the observables into the smoothed fundamental shocks
and perform some counterfactual exercises on the last 3 years of GDP growth to identify the driving
forces of the Great Recession.
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3.1 Data and Prior Selection
I estimate the model by Bayesian methods on sample that spans from 1989Q1 to 2010Q1. To
estimate the model parameters I use the following vector of eight observable time series, obtained
from Haver Analytics:
logXt; log It; logCt; R
B
t ; t; Spt; log (Lt) ; log
Wt
Pt

.
The dataset is composed of the log growth rate of real per-capita GDP, Xt = Ct+It+Gt, investment,
It, and aggregate consumption, Ct, the federal funds rate mapped into the model nominal risk-free
rate, RBt , the GDP price deator, t, the spread of high-yield B-rated corporate bonds from the
Merrill Lynch's High Yield Master le versus AAA corporate yields of comparable maturity, Spt, the
log of per-capita hours worked and the growth rate of real hourly wages, WtPt . Notice that I choose
the observed spread, Spt, to map into the model dierence between the borrowing cost of Sellers
and the yield on risk-free government bonds, up to a measurement error Spt  N

0; 2
Sp

:
Spt = Et
"
log
 
RKt+1 + (1  )QAt+1
QAt
!
 RBt
#
+ Spt
The choice of this particular series of spreads uniforms to the literature that nds high-yield spreads
to have a signicant predictive content for economic activity (Gertler and Lown (1999)). In particular
these spreads are the mid-credit-quality-spectrum spreads that Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajsek
(2009) nd to be good predictors of unemployment and investment dynamics. The measurement
error is intended to account for the dierences in the federal funds rate and the AAA corporate bond
yield, used as reference points to compute the spread in the model and the data respectively. The
measurement error is also intended to correct for the imperfect mapping of rates of return on equity
in the model onto yields on state-non-contingent bonds in the data.
Estimates for the parameters are obtained by maximizing the posterior distribution of the model
(An and Schorfheide (2007)) over the vector of observables. The posterior function combines the
model likelihood function with prior distributions imposed on model parameters and on theoretical
moments of specic variables of interest.
The choice of the priors for most parameters of the model is rather standard in the literature
(Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007), Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010))
and is reported in table 3.
A few words are necessary to discuss the priors selection on parameters that inuence en-
trepreneurs' investment nancing decisions and the eciency of nancial intermediation in the model.
I set a Gamma prior on the steady state quarterly intermediation cost,  qss, with mean equal to 62:5
basis points and standard deviation equal to 15, compatible with an annual intermediation costs
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of 250 basis points chosen by Curdia and Woodford (2010a) to match the median spread between
the Federal Reserve Board index of commercial and industrial loan rates and the federal funds rate,
over the period 1986-2007. I use my analysis of quarterly Compustat cash ow data to set the prior
mean and standard deviation on the steady state level of the nancing gap share, FGS.
The aggregate of entrepreneurs in the model can easily represent the universe of corporations
in Compustat: they earn operating cash ows from their capital stock and use them to nance
new capital expenditures. They also access nancial markets to either raise external nancing or to
liquidate part of their assets.
Starting from the accounting cash ow identity (3) in section 1, I can map its components to the
ow of funds constraint of an entrepreneur that is willing to buy and install new capital goods in
my model in section 2:
PCe;t| {z }
DIVe;t
+ PKt ie;t| {z }
CAPXe;t
 
264QAt  (1  )Ne;t 1| {z }
NFIe;t
+
 
RBt 1Be;t 1  Be;t
| {z }
CASHe;t
375  QAt Ae;tie;t| {z }
(CFDe;t+CFEOe;t )
= RKt Ne;t 1| {z }
CFOe;t
(31)
The returns on the equity holdings, RKt Ne;t 1, correspond to the operating cash ows, CFOe;t. En-
trepreneur's nominal consumption, PtCe;t, can be identied with dividends paid to equity holders,
DIVe;t, and the purchase of new capital goods, P
K
t ie;t, with capital expenditures, CAPXe;t. Net -
nancial operations in Compustat, NFIe;t, are mapped into net sales of old equity claims, Q
A
t  (1  )
Ne;t 1, while variations in the amount of liquidity, CASHe;t, correspond in the model to net
acquisitions of government bonds,
 
RBt 1Bt 1  Bt

. Finally transfers from debt and equity hold-
ers, CFDe;t + CF
EO
e;t , correspond to issuances of equity claims on the new capital goods installed,
QAt Ae;tie;t.
From (31), it is easy to derive the model equivalent of the Financing Gap Share dened in
(5). Entrepreneurs with the best technology to install capital goods (sellers) are willing to borrow
resources and to utilize their liquid assets to carry on their investment. The aggregate nancing gap
over the s;t measure of sellers, S, can be written as:
FGt =
Z
S
2664RKt Ns;t 1| {z }
CFOs;t
 PCs;t| {z }
DIVs;t
  PKt is;t| {z }
CAPXs;t
3775 f(As;t)ds
=
Z
S
2664QAt  (1  )Ns;t 1| {z }
NFIs;t
+
 
RBt 1Bs;t 1  Bs;t
| {z }
CASHs;t
  QAt As;tis;t| {z }
(CFDs;t+CFEOs;t )
3775 f(As;t)ds
= QAt

 (1  )s;tNt 1 +
Z
S
As;tis;tf(As;t)ds

+RBt 1s;tBs;t 1.
so that the average nancing gap share is equal to the mean ratio of the market value of the re-
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sources raised by external nance, QAt As;tie;t, those raised by liquidation of selling illiquid securities,
QAt  (1  )s;tNt 1, and from the liquid assets that come to maturity, RBt 1s;tBt 1, over aggregate
investment, It along the sample period:
FGSss =
QAss
 
 (1  )s;ssNss +
R
S As;ssis;ssf(As;ss)ds

+RBsss;ssBss
Iss
.
I set a Beta prior on the distribution of FGSss, with mean equal to 0:35 and standard deviation
equal to 0:01.
Similarly, I use Compustat evidence to choose a prior on the steady state share of the nancing
gap that is covered by portfolio liquidations of equity claims, QAss(  (1-) s;ssNss), and government
bonds, RBss s;ss Bs;ss:
LIQSSS =
QAss
 
 (1  )s;ssNss

+RBsss;ssBs;ss
FGss
.
I choose a prior the average share of the Financing Gap covered by portfolio liquidations, LIQSss,
to be a Beta distribution with mean equal to .25 and a standard deviation of .10.
I also help the identication of  by calibrating the share of government liquidity held by en-
trepreneurs over GDP, BSS=Yt. I choose to calibrate the amount of liquid assets in circulation in
the economy by referring to the Flow of funds data on corporate asset levels (table L.102). There, I
identify a broad set of government-backed liquid assets held by rms that include Treasuries, Cur-
rency, Checking and Saving deposits, Municipal Bonds, and GSE and Agency-backed private bonds.
Along the sample considered, corporate holdings of government-backed liquid assets amounts to a
share of around 5% of GDP. I therefore x BoY = 0:05. This is clearly and understatement of the
extent of the average amount of government-backed liquidity over GDP present in the US economy,
where the public debt over GDP alone in the same time frame amounts to an average of around
60%. I make this choice because aggregate Flow of funds data suggest that rms are not the primary
holders of government bonds and because the primary goal of this work is to oer a realistic picture
of the balance sheet and cash ow statements of US corporations to study the interaction between
nancial market conditions and investment decisions.
This brings the discussion to the calibration of scal parameters that govern the government
budget constraint in steady state:
Bss + 
kRkssKss + 
lWssLss = R
B
ssBss +

1  1
gss

Yss + Tss (32)
To calibrate the tax rates on capital and labor income, k and  l, I rely on work on scal policy
in DSGE models by Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010). I calibrate the distortionary tax rate on
labor and capital income,  l and K , to 23% and 18% respectively. I choose the steady state value
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for gss to match the 19% average share of government expenditures over GDP observed during the
sample period. Having pinned down the level of government-backed liquidity, the steady state share
of lump-sum transfers to households over GDP can be found by solving (32). Transfers dynamics
instead govern the aggregate supply of liquid assets in general equilibrium over time by means of
the taxation rule:
Tt=Yt
Tss=Yss
=

log Yt s

 'Y Bt=Yt
BoY
 'B
where I calibrate 'B = 0:4 as in Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) , a value that makes this scal
rule passive by reducing transfers when the share of government debt over GDP deviates from its
steady state value. This locks the economy on a stable equilibrium path for the growth rate of the
price level, with no conict with the monetary authority's Taylor-type rule (Woodford (2003)). I x
the elasticity of transfers to deviation of output growth from it steady state, 'Y = 0:13, at the value
that Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010)'s estimate for transfers reactions to output deviations from
steady state in a stationary model. Notice that the transfers policy is countercyclical (when output
growth is low, transfers to households are higher).
A few more choices of priors require a brief discussion. In particular, the parameters governing
the distribution of idiosyncratic technology of entrepreneurs Ae;t  U

Alo; Ahi

. I set priors on Alow
and on the dierence d = Ahigh   Alow, so that combined with prior mean values for the nancial
parameters, I can approximately match the steady state share of Sellers in the model with the
average share of Compustat rms that rely on nancial markets in every quarter, 45%. Finally, I
calibrate the quarterly rate of capital depreciation to 0:025, a standard value in the RBC and DSGE
literature.
The model is bueted by i.i.d. random innovations:
h
"zt ; "
mp
t ; "
g
t ; "
p
t ; "
w
t ; "
q
t ; "
b
t
i
that respectively hit seven exogenous processes: the growth rate of total factor productivity, zt,
deviations from he Taylor rule mp;t, the share of government spending over GDP, gt, the price and
wage mark-ups, pt and 
w
t , the nancial intermediation wedge, 
q
t and the discount factor, bt.
To conclude, the priors on the persistence parameters for the exogenous processes are all Beta
distributions. All have mean equal to 0.6 and standard deviation 0.2, except for the persistence
of the neutral technology process, z. The monetary policy shock is assumed to be i.i.d., because
the Taylor rule already allows for autocorrelation in the determination of the risk-free rate. The
priors on the standard deviations of the innovations expressed in percentage deviations are inverse
Gammas with mean 0.5 and standard deviation equal to 1, excluding the shock to the monetary
policy rule, "mpt , to the price and wage mark-ups, "
p
t and "
w
t , and to the discount factor, where the
prior has a mean of 0.10 and a standard deviation of 1. I set a prior on the standard deviation of
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the measurement error on the spread that wants to be conservative with a mean of 15 basis points
and a standard deviation of 5.
I complement this set of calibrated parameters and exogenous priors, with prior information on
the second moments of the observed variables computed over a pre-sample that spans from 1954Q3
to 1988Q4. Pre-sample data is available for all the series, excluding the spread, Spt. In particular, I
follow Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010) and set prior distributions on the variance of the
observable variables using the asymptotic Normal distribution of their GMM estimator computed
over the pre-sample. This allows me to help the identication of the highly-parametrized model
and to help the estimation procedure to identify regions of the parameter space that can generate
business cycle uctuations of plausible magnitude. Table 5 reports the mean and standard deviations
of the moment priors.
4 Results
This section reports the results of the Bayesian estimation of the model parameters, devolving
particular attention to the coecients that govern the nancial structure of the model. I then discuss
the model t and describe the impulse responses of key variables to a nancial intermediation shock.
I present the variance decomposition of the observable variables and their historical decomposition
during the Great Recession. I conclude the section with evidence that wage rigidities are the key
element that allows the nancial intermediation shock to play a fundamental role in driving the
business cycle in the past 20 years of data.
4.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 3 reports the median and 90% condence intervals for the set of model parameters, while table
6 reports the same quantiles for model-implied moments of the key nancial variables introduced in
section 1 and compares them with their empirical counterparts. I compute the condence interval
by running a Markov chain Monte Carlo exploration of the posterior distribution.
Estimates of conventional parameters such as those governing price and wage rigidities, the
investment adjustment cost friction as well as the degree of persistence and magnitudes of traditional
shocks are in line with previous ndings in the literature. The estimated steady state annualized
spread, 400 q, ranges between 1 and 36 basis points, despite its prior distribution mean matching
a quarterly risk spread equal to 250 basis points (Curdia and Woodford (2010b)). The estimation
favors steady state equilibria in which nancial intermediation costs are low and attributes the
observed cyclical uctuations in the spread to large realizations of the nancial shock (see 7 where
the model-implied volatility of the spread is higher than in the data).
Table 6 shows that the estimated steady state value of the nancing gap share assumes values
that are consistent with Compustat evidence. The 90% condence interval for the model-implied
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moment ranges between [34:9%; 37:8%], compatible with the 35:5% fraction of total investment
funded using nancial markets found in Compustat data in section 1. The estimated steady state
share of the nancing gap that is covered by liquidation of assets ranges between [23:6%; :29:6%],
compatible with the 24:3% average over the whole sample period available in Compustat.
Finally, the table shows the average over time of the fraction of rms that record a negative Fi-
nancing Gap in Compustat in each quarter and compares its model equivalent, s;t = PrfFGe;t  0g.
The model estimation does not match this moment perfectly, although the 90% condence interval
([58:6%; 63:4%]) contains values that are far from the sample realization observed in Compustat
(49%).
4.2 Model Fit
Table 7 reports condence intervals for the standard deviations of the variables relative to output
volatility and compares them to the sample data standard deviations. The table also includes the
standard deviations implied by the endogenous priors on the second moments of the observables
introduced in section 3.1.
The model is able to match the absolute volatility of investment, as well as the standard deviation
of the risk-free-rate observed in the data. The estimation also delivers standard deviations that
are compatible with pre-sample evidence for ination and hours worked and tries to balance the
dierences in the volatility of the growth rate of real wages across the two periods. The model
however comes short when trying to match the standard deviations of output and consumption. As
discussed in section 2.7, workers in the model earn and consume a large fraction of total GDP, with no
access to nancial market that can help smooth out the eect of aggregate shocks on labor earnings
over time. The increased volatility in households' consumption translates in higher volatility of total
output and prevents the model from delivering a successful matching of the relative volatility of the
observables (Table 7).
Table 8 reports the autocorrelation coecients of order one of the observable variables, compared
to their data counterparts. The model is able to reproduce signicant positive autocorrelations for all
the observables, except for consumption growth. The model matches the autocorrelations coecients
for the nominal interest rate, the spread, the level of hours worked and for the rate of growth of
real wages (computed excluding the last recession, see note in table 8) at a 90% condence level.
It fails to generate a sucient level of persistence for output, investment and consumption, while it
overstates the autocorrelation of ination.
4.3 Impulse Responses to a Financial Intermediation Shock
Figure 8 reports the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation nancial shock, evaluated at the
estimated parameter mode.
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The plots are intuitive and show a recession of plausible magnitude, in which the negative
response of output, consumption and investment on impact is signicant at a 90% condence level.
When the nancial intermediation cost rises, the spread between the cost of raising external
resources of entrepreneurs and the risk free rate rises by 150 basis points on an annual basis. In-
vestment drops by 2% on impact, while consumption growth is reduced by 0:2%. Accordingly, the
growth rate of output falls by 0:5%.
A remarkable feature of the impulse responses is that a negative nancial shock in the model
delivers a large drop in the price of equity, driving it 4% below its steady state level on impact.
Hence, the nancial intermediation shock generates intuitive and highly volatily cyclical movements
in asset prices. This nding contrasts with the rise in equity price that follows a liquidity shock in
the original KM model as carefully characterized by Shi (2011). 20
The high degree of persistence of the impulse responses is attributable partly to the high auto-
correlation coecient of the exogenous process for the intermediation cost,  qt , that tries to match
the features of the observed high-yield spread in the data (gure 10). In addition, the slow conver-
gence of the economy to its steady state after a nancial intermediation shock is also due to the
path followed by equilibrium real wages and aggregate consumption. As discussed in section 2.7,
households do not trade on nancial markets and consequently are only able to smooth out their
consumption through wage re-optimization. Modeling entrepreneurs and workers as members of a
single representative household, as in Shi (2011), can eliminate barriers to intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing and allow for a less persistent response of real wages and workers' consumption path.
21
One additional source of persistence originates from the endogenous eect that a nancial shock
has on the average investment technology adopted in the economy. A negative nancial shock
increase the cost of borrowing for the most productive entrepreneurs (with a high level of investment
technology). The nancial shock also reduces the rate of return to savings on nancial assets. This
induces some of the less ecient entrepreneurs to start using their capital accumulation technology
instead of trading assets on nancial markets. Referring to gure 7, higher nancial intermediation
costs lower the amount of external resources available to the most ecient entrepreneurs and at the
same increase the fraction of Keepers, so that as a result the average relative price of investment
in the economy goes up. Empirical work by Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) shows
that investment-specic technology shocks (ISTSs) can account for large fractions of business cycle
20Nezafat and Slavk (2009) similarly document that in the KM set-up, a negative shock to entrepreneurs' borrowing
capacity (an exogenous drop in  in the model) also generates a rise in asset prices. Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero,
and Kiyotaki (2010) also note how in the KM model the interaction of negative liquidity shocks with a binding zero
lower bound on the nominal interest rate and the presence of price rigidities can generate signicant drops in asset
prices and recessions comparable in size to the Great Depression.
21It is interesting to note how Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010) have adopted both modeling
strategies in dierent versions of their work and that the introduction of a representative household has left their
predictions largely unchanged both quantitatively and qualitatively with respect to a model with both entrepreneurs
and workers.
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variation in output and suggest that these disturbances could originate on nancial markets. Kahn
and Thomas (2011) also study the eects of credit market shocks on the allocation of capital across
rms with heterogeneous productivity. They nd that credit shocks are amplied and propagated
through large negative endogenous technology shocks, generated by disruptions to the distribution of
capital away from the most productive rms. In my model a nancial shock is paired endogenously
with a negative ISTS.22
4.4 Variance Decomposition
This section quanties the relative importance of the fundamental shocks in the model in driving
business cycle uctuations. Table 9 reports the contribution of each shock to the volatility of the
observable variables in periodic cycles that range between 6 to 32 quarters in length, as in Stock
and Watson (1999).
The sixth column suggests that the nancial intermediation shock is the most important source
of business cycle uctuations, explaining around 35% of the unconditional variance of GDP growth
and around 60% of the volatility of investment. The shock is also able to explain around 40% of
cyclical movements in ination and the vast majority of the variance of the nominal risk-free rate.
This result suggests an active role of monetary policy through the Taylor rule in response to changes
in output and prices induced by nancial disturbances.23
The nancial intermediation wedge,  qt , maps closely to the observed high-yield spread series. The
estimation procedure naturally attributes around 100% of cyclical uctuations of the observed spread
to the nancial shock. This result is a product of the log-linearization of the model's equilibrium
conditions that does not allow pricing of other sources of aggregate risk.24
Column 1 in table 9 shows how, according to the model estimates, neutral technology shocks
only explain a small fraction of the variance of GDP growth in the last 20 years. The 90% condence
inverval for the share of GDP growth variance explained by TFP shocks ranges from 9% to 20%. This
result conrms the conclusions of previous work in the empirical macro literature that attributes the
22One more interesting consequence of the interaction of nancial shocks with the aggregate investment technology
pertains to the dynamics of the price of capital. In my model, with heterogeneous entrepreneurs and an intermediation
sector, after a negative nancial shock hits the price of traded equity at which banks are willing to buy assets,
qAt , plunges while the average relative price of investment rises. In a representative agent model the price of capital
necessarily coincides with the relative price of investment. The negative co-movement of the price of capital and output
induced by ISTSs leads Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) to prefer nancial shocks over ISTSs as important
drivers of the business cycle. My model shows that the two sources of aggregate uctuations can be strictly connected
and that in particular ISTSs can have a nancial origin.
23Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) nd that nancial (risk) shocks in a Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
framework can account for around 20% and 30% of output uctuations in the U.S. and the Euro Area respectively.
Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011) nd that the same shock explains 25% of output growth and 75% of
investment growth in a small open economy like Sweden.
24The estimation of higher order perturbations of the solution of a model with similar frictions and a high degree
of risk aversion could identify dierent sources of time-varying risk premia in the spreads. I leave this extension for
future research.
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cause of economic uctuations in the past 20 years predominantly to demand shocks.25
4.5 Smoothed Shocks and Historical Decomposition of the Great Recession
In this section I present the historical contribution of the nancial shock to the dynamics of output
growth along the sample and run some counterfactual exercises to study the contribution of aggregate
shocks to the dynamics of the Great Recession.
Figure 11 provides a time series representation of the evolution of quarterly output growth
conditional on the presence of nancial shocks alone (red dotted line) and compares it to the observed
data series (black solid line). The two lines show remarkably similar features and the nancial shock
seems to drive output growth variations alone in the boom of the 2000s. The shock is also identied
as the main cause of the recessions in 1990-1991, when the junk bond market and the Savings and
Loans industry collapsed, as well as in 2008-2010, marked by the upheaval on the subprime mortgage
market.
Figure 12 oers a closer look at the contribution of shocks in the model to the evolution of
output growth during the last recession. I concentrate on the role of nancial shocks, "
q
t , as well as
of the neutral technology shocks, "zt , and the two policy disturbances: the monetary policy shocks,
"mpt , modeled as random deviations from the Taylor rule, and the government spending shock, "
g
t . I
compute the counterfactual smoothed series for output growth at the posterior mode. This exercise
shows how output growth dynamics would have diered from the path observed in the data when
excluding the smoothed realizations of each type of shock one at a time.
For example, the top left panel in gure 12 shows what output growth would have been in
absence of the nancial shock (red dashed line) compared to the data (blue solid line) from 2007Q1
to 2010Q1. The estimation suggests that a series of negative nancial shocks raised intermediation
costs and slowed down output growth starting in 2007Q3. In absence of the negative nancial shocks,
the contraction in output growth observed in the data would have been observed only in the second
half of 2008 and be limited in magnitude.
A second interesting nding comes from the analysis of the role of innovations to total factor
productivity. The top right panel suggests that the past recession was characterized by an increase
in TFP, in line with recent ndings by Fernald (2009) and Shimer (2010). As evidenced by the red
dashed line, in absence of positive technology shocks, output would have contracted by an additional
0:5% at the trough and the recovery would have been slower.
The bottom left panel also suggests that government spending shocks played an important role
in reducing the impact on output of the recession. In absence of positive government spending
25For estimations on a similar sample period see Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010). In support of a reduced
role for technology shocks in recent history, Shimer (2010) nds no evidence in the last 20 years of U.S. data that labor
productivity and real wages are procyclical. More specically, Fernald (2009) reports that TFP has increased during
the last recession, in line with the path of smoothed productivity shocks that I obtain from my model. See section 4.5
for more details.
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shocks, the red dashed line shows that output would have fallen by an additional 1% at the trough.
Public sector decits are benecial in the model, as nancially constrained entrepreneurs demand
government bonds as a form of precautionary savings to insure against the future arrival of investment
opportunities, in the spirit of policy experiments in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) and Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2011).
On the other hand, the bottom right panel and the smoothed series of monetary policy shocks in
gure 13 seem to suggest that, although the reduction in the fed funds rate helped sustain economic
growth at the onset of the recession, monetary policy interventions became ineective and that the
zero-lower bound on the nominal interest rate became binding in the second half of 2008. The
series of positive monetary policy shocks in gure 13 suggest that the nominal interest rate has been
consistently higher than the value implied by the estimated Taylor-type rule.26
4.6 Why are Financial Shocks Important?
Any general equilibrium model that aims to identify the role of non-TFP shocks as possible drivers
of business cycle uctuations has to be able to generate the positive co-movement between con-
sumption and investment observed in the data at business cycle frequencies. In an inuential article,
Barro and King (1984) show how, in a general equilibrium model with exible prices and wages in
the Real Business Cycle tradition, it is hard to detect sources of business cycle uctuations dierent
from changes in total factor productivity, that can trigger positive co-movement of hours worked,
consumption and investment. In fact, any shock that increases the equilibrium quantity of hours
worked on impact has to induce a contemporaneous drop in consumption to maintain the equilib-
rium equality between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and hours worked (see Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) for further details).
In this section I explore the reason why the posterior maximization favors the nancial shock as
the main driver of business cycle uctuations. I nd that nominal rigidities, and in particular sticky
wages are the key element in driving aggregate consumption, investment and hours worked in the
same direction on impact after a nancial intermediation shock.
4.6.1 Sticky Wages and Positive Co-movement of Investment and Consumption
In this section I discuss the importance of the assumption of nominal and real wage rigidities in
generating a recession in which aggregate output, consumption and investment drop simultaneously
on impact after the shock. To establish the importance of the frictions, I rst discuss the impulse
responses in the benchmark model estimated under the assumption that wages are sticky. I then
26Research by Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010) suggests that unconventional monetary policy
(e.g. in the model, public supply of liquid assets, Bt in exchange for illiquid ones, Nt) can play an important role in
sustaining economic activity after a negative shock to the liquidity of traded assets, especially when the zero lower
bound is binding. For estimation purposes, I abstract from imposing the zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate.
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re-estimate the model under exible wages and compare the impulse responses to the benchmark. I
nally analyze the variance decomposition of the model under exible wages and note how the new
assumption signicantly reduces the importance of the nancial intermediation shock in explaining
business cycle uctuations.
In my model there are two classes of agents: entrepreneurs and households. Entrepreneurs
optimize their stream of consumption through time and save by accumulating equity claims as well
as government bonds. They do not supply hours worked on the labor market. Households, on
the other hand, have no access to nancial markets and consume the realization of their income in
every period. This feature of the model allows me to intuitively describe the inter-temporal and the
intratemporal transmission channels of an intermediation shock, by studying the eects on each of
the two sets of agents separately.
Figure 9 shows the impulse responses for aggregate output, investment and consumption growth
to a one-standard deviation nancial shock, together with the breakdown of aggregate consumption
into entrepreneurs' and households' shares, Cet and C
w
t respectively. The gure also shows the
dynamics of hours worked. The impulse response in the black dashed lines are computed at the
posterior mode parameters in table 3 for the benchmark model with price and wage rigidities.
On the intertemporal margin, If the intermediation spread,  qt , rises and intermediation of -
nancial claims becomes more expensive, entrepreneurs with a good investment opportunity perceive
an increase in their cost of borrowing: the price of equity claims drops and entrepreneurs can rely
on a reduced amount of external resources to install new capital. As a consequence investment,
It, plunges. On the other side of the nancial market, entrepreneurs with inecient technologies
expect lower real returns on nancial assets and consequently reduce their savings and increase their
consumption. On aggregate, investment and savings drop, while consumption of entrepreneurs, Cet ,
rises.27
On the intratemporal margin, instead, the model is able to make households' consumption drop
27Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010) also emphasize that KM's model of liquidity shocks can
produce positive co-movement between consumption and investment when the economy features a certain degree of
nominal rigidities. The transmission mechanism is similar to one proposed in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2011)
and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010). While in a frictionless RBC model a negative intertemporal shock (e.g.
a nancial shock) reduces aggregate investment, lowers the real interest rate and drives up consumption, in a Neo-
Keynesian model with nominal rigidities, the real interest rate is approximately dened as the dierence between the
nominal interest rate and expected future ination:
rBt ' RBt   Et (t+1)
and depends on the monetary authority decisions. If, following the shock, prices are expected to drop and the central
bank does not decrease the nominal interest rate enough, the real interest rate can rise. The price of capital has
to drop to re-establish non-arbitrage between government bonds and equity claims. At the same time consumption
will drop, together with investment. In Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010), the negative shift in
asset prices, consumption and entrepreneurial net worth is particularly pronounced when the nominal interest rate
hits the zero lower bound: in that case any expected future drop in the price level translates into an increase of the
real interest rate of the same magnitude with potential disastrous eects on every component of aggregate output. As
I discuss later in this section, in my model the intertemporal transmission channel is not as important in delivering
the positive co-movement between consumption and investment as is instead the eect of wage rigidities on the labor
market dynamic equilibrium in response to an aggregate demand shock.
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on impact thanks to sticky wages. The drop in aggregate demand translates into a downward shift
in the demand for labor inputs. If workers cannot re-optimize their wages freely, the decrease in
labor demand translates into a large drop in the equilibrium amount of hours worked, Lt. The
drop in hours amplies the negative eect of the shock on aggregate production and GDP, and
contemporaneously reduces the wage bill, WtLt. In equilibrium the drop in the wage bill pushes
down households' and aggregate consumption, Cwt and Ct, and generates the right positive co-
movement between investment and consumption on impact. The shock has also a secondary eect:
the fall in aggregate demand reduces the marginal costs of intermediate monopolists and increases
the price mark-up and rms' monopolistic prots. Households own the intermediate rms and the
rise in prots levels helps them sustain their consumption after the shock hits. The secondary eect
however is not strong enough to dominate the drop in households' consumption generated by the
decrease in the aggregate wage bill.28
To conrm this intuition, gure 9 also shows the impulse response functions for the same variables
at the posterior mode, when the model is re-estimated under the assumption that wages are perfectly
exible (blue solid lines).29 As in the case of sticky wages, the reduction in labor demand translates
into lower equilibrium wages and hours worked. Simultaneously, lower real wages translate into
higher mark-ups for the monopolistic rms and the increase in rms' prots. This generates a
positive income eect for households that allows them to reduce their labor supply. The equilibrium
outcome shows a larger negative adjustment in the wage rate relative to the benchmark sticky
wages model, while hours worked drop by a lower amount. Households' wage bill falls, but they
are able to keep a smoother consumption prole with respect to the sticky wages case by relying
on both a sustained equilibrium level of hours worked and higher prots from the monopolistic
rms. As a consequence, the drop in households' consumption is not large enough to drive aggregate
consumption down in response to a nancial intermediation shock. Consumption and investment
move in opposite direction in the short run and the nancial shock loses its ability to generate an
empirically plausible recession.
This intuition is conrmed by comparing the variance decomposition exercises for the model
estimated under the assumption of sticky and exible wages. I report results for the two cases
respectively in tables 9 and 10.30 The estimation of the model under exible wages shows that the
importance of the nancial intermediation shock in explaining business cycle uctuations in output,
investment and consumption growth drops signicantly with respect to the sticky wages model.
The shock is able to explain 9.5% of GDP growth variance and 49% of aggregate investment growth
variance compared to 35% and 60% under sticky wages. The nancial shock in the benchmark model
is able to explain 7% of business cycle volatility in aggregate consumption, while under exible wages
28The assumption that households own intermediate rms is controversial, but necessary to keep the entrepreneurs'
optimal consumption, investment and trading decisions tractable.
29The estimated parameters and posterior characterization for the model with exible wages are reported in table 5.
30Parameter estimates or the model with exible wages are reported in table 4.
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it can account for a mere 1%.
This result is in line with the intuition discussed for the impulse responses in gure 9: nan-
cial intermediation shocks are not able to generate the right co-movement between investment and
consumption and hence meaningful booms and recessions. Consequently, under exible wages TFP
shocks gain importance in explaining business cycle uctuations as in the traditional RBC literature
(from 13% to 30% of GDP growth volatility explained at business cycle frequencies). Similarly,
exogenous shocks to wage mark-ups, w, increase their relevance in explaining aggregate cycles.
As noted in Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010), sticky wages drive an endogenous wedge
between the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours worked
in the intratemporal Euler equation of the households. Under exible wages, exogenous shocks to
the wage mark-up substitute the endogenous change in equilibrium mark-ups induced by the other
structural shocks (including nancial intermediation shocks) in the sticky-wage case. As a result,
exogenous wage mark-up shocks go from explaining 12% of GDP growth variance under sticky wages
to 25% under exible wages.31
5 Conclusions
In this paper I have addressed the question of how important are shocks to the ability of the nancial
sector in driving the business cycle. The main nding of this research is that the contribution of
nancial shocks to cyclical uctuations is very large and accounts for around 35% of output and
60% of investment volatility, when estimated on the last 20 years of US macro data.
To establish this result, I have estimated a dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal
rigidities and nancial frictions in which entrepreneurs rely on external nance and trading of nan-
cial claims to fund their investments. The model features stylized nancial intermediaries (banks)
that bear a cost to transfer resources from savers to investors.
Shocks to the nancial intermediation costs intuitively map into movements of the interest rate
spreads and are able to explain the dynamics of the real variables that shaped the last recession,
as well as the 1990-1991 downturn and the boom of the 2000s. I nd that nominal rigidities play
an important role in the transmission of the nancial shocks. In particular wage rigidities allow the
shock to generate the positive co-movement of investment and consumption that is observed in the
data along the business cycles. Assuming exible wages and re-estimating the model on the same
data series along the same sample period delivers very dierent results: the nancial intermediation
shock is only able to explain around 9.5% of output growth and 49% of investment growth volatilities.
31For further support to the role of wage rigidities in the transmission of intertemporal disturbances see also
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) and Furlanetto and Seneca (2010) on investment-specic technology
shocks.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Compustat and Flow of Funds data on Capital Expenditures and Investment
Vt
Moment CAPXt FoF CAPXt FoF It
E[CAPXtVt ] 1 73.11% 35.64%
E[ log Vt] 0.96% 1.03% 0.81%
100 Stdev[ logVt] 4.9% 2.7% 3.6%
Corr[ logVt,  logCAPXt] 1 0.63 0.30
Variables Vt in columns are: CAPXt: Compustat aggregate Capital Expenditure; FoF CAPXt:
Flow of Funds Corporate Capital Expenditure; FoF It: Flow of Funds Aggregate Investment. The
table reports: E[CAPXtVt ]: the average fraction of each variable represented by Compustat Capital
Expenditure; 100 E[ log Vt]: the average quarterly growth rate of the series along the sample period;
100 Stdev[ log Vt]: the standard deviation of the quarterly growth rate of the series; Corr[ logVt,
 logCAPXt]: the correlation of each series with CAPXt.
Source: Compustat and Flow of Funds Tables. Sample Period 1989Q1 - 2010Q1.
Table 2: Compustat Evidence on Corporate Investment Financing
Variable Vt Mean(Vt) StdDev(Vt)
FGS1t 35.45% 4.74%
FGSt - Annual (Chari - Kehoe method)
2 18.74% 5.17%
FGSt - Quarterly (Chari - Kehoe method)
3 39.12% 6.75%
WKS4t 32.05% 4.34%
DIVS5t 25.87% 7.02%
{
DESt = External Financet / FG
6
t 75.67% 22.45%
LIQSt = Portfolio Liquidationst / FG
7
t 24.33% 22.45%
CASHSt = CASHt / FG
8
t 20.74% 14.49%
Mean and standard deviations of variables across sample Period 1989Q1 - 2010Q1, if not otherwise
specied. Source: Compustat.
1. Financing Gap Share of Capital Expenditure dened in equation 5, total of U.S. corporations.
2. Financing Gap Share, Chari and Kehoe's method, total of North American corporations (U.S.
and Canada). Sample period: 1971 - 2009.
3. Financing Gap Share, Chari and Kehoe's method, total of North American corporations.
4. Share of Total Financing Gap due to working capital needs. U.S. corporations.
5. Weight of Dividend payouts on Total Financing Gap. U.S. corporations.
6. Share of Financing Gap funded by external sources (debt and/or equity). U.S. corporations.
7. Share of Financing Gap funded by portfolio liquidations. U.S. corporations
8. Share of Financing Gap funded by variations in cash reserves. U.S. corporations
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Parameters Estimates - Sticky Wages
Table 3: Calibrated Values, Priors and Posterior Estimates for the Model
Parameters
Parameter Explanation Prior1 Mode [ 5%2 95%2 ]
Alow Entrepreneurs's N(0:90; :010) 0:879 [ 0:787   1:065 ]
tech distribution (level)
d Entrepreneurs's IG(0:025; 0:05) 0:023 [ 0:019   0:033 ]
tech distribution (width) 
 1   1 100 Discount factor Calibrated 0:900 [       ]
h Habit Calibrated 0:900 [       ]
logLss Labor Supply N(2; 0:50) 1:779 [ 1:027   2:604 ]
 Inverse Frisch G(2; 0:50) 1:295 [ 0:862   1:961 ]
 Borrowing Constraint B(0:30; 0:10) 0:271 [ 0:257   0:297 ]
 100 Liquidity Constraint G(0:50; 0:10) 0:074 [ 0:027   0:102 ]
BoY Liquidity over GDP Calibrated 0:025 [       ]
'B Fiscal Rule - Debt Calibrated 0:500 [       ]
'B Fiscal Rule - Output Calibrated 0:130 [       ]
K Capital Tax Rate Calibrated 0:184 [       ]
 l Labor Tax Rate Calibrated 0:223 [       ]
 Share of Capital B(0:30; 0:10) 0:287 [ 0:266   0:315 ]
S Investment Adj. Costs G(2; 0:50) 1:276 [ 0:965   2:060 ]
p Price Mark-up IG(0:15; 0:05) 0:061 [ 0:047   0:079 ]
p Calvo prices B(0:70; 0:10) 0:799 [ 0:722   0:835 ]
p Indexation Prices B(0:50; 0:15) 0:125 [ 0:058   0:236 ]
w Wage Mark-up IG(0:15; 0:05) 0:124 [ 0:090   0:226 ]
w Calvo wages B(0:70; 0:10) 0:729 [ 0:654   0:781 ]
w Indexation Wages B(0:50; 0:15) 0:201 [ 0:118   0:378 ]
 Taylor rule - Ination N(1:7; 0:30) 1:900 [ 1:716   2:091 ]
y Taylor rule - Output N(0:125; 0:05) 0:269 [ 0:2400   0:300 ]
continued
42
Parameter Explanation Prior1 Mode [ 5%2 95%2 ]
R Taylor rule - Persistence B(0:60; 0:20) 0:847 [ 0:815   0:870 ]
ss SS Ination N(0:50; 0:10) 0:758 [ 0:584   0:849 ]
 SS Output Growth N(0:30; 0:05) 0:326 [ 0:254   0:395 ]
q SS Spread G(0:625; 0:15) 0:018 [ 0:003   0:090 ]
p MA(1) Price Mark-up B(0:50; 0:10) 0:820 [ 0:653   0:853 ]
w MA(1) Wage Mark-up B(0:50; 0:10) 0:660 [ 0:416   0:751 ]
z AR(1) TFP shock B(0:40; 0:20) 0:412 [ 0:301   0:487 ]
g AR(1) Gov't spending B(0:60; 0:20) 0:982 [ 0:960   0:991 ]
p AR(1) Price Mark-up B(0:60; 0:20) 0:933 [ 0:880   0:968 ]
w AR(1) Wage Mark-up B(0:60; 0:20) 0:890 [ 0:784   0:914 ]
q AR(1) Financial Spread B(0:60; 0:20) 0:981 [ 0:972   0:984 ]
b AR(1) Intertemporal pref. B(0:40; 0:20) 0:973 [ 0:947   0:990 ]
z Stdev TFP Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:482 [ 0:431   0:515 ]
mp Stdev MP Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:119 [ 0:107   0:140 ]
g Stdev Gov't Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:326 [ 0:296   0:376 ]
p Stdev Pr. Mark-up Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:151 [ 0:127   0:187 ]
w Stdev Wage Mark-up Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:298 [ 0:264   0:368 ]
q Stdev Financial Shock IG(0:50; 1) 4:870 [ 4:212   5:603 ]
b Stdev Preference Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:027 [ 0:025   0:030 ]
 Stdev Meas Error Spread IG(0:25; 1) 0:475 [ 0:482   0:565 ]
Standard deviations of the shocks are scaled by 100 for the estimation with respect to the model.
1 N stands for Normal, B Beta, G Gamma and IG Inverse-Gamma1 distribution.
2 Posterior percentiles from 3 chains of 100,000 draws generated using a Random walk Metropolis
algorithm.
Acceptance rate 31%. Burning period: initial 20,000 draws. Observations retained: one in every 10
draws.
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Parameters Estimates - Flexible Wages
Table 4: Calibrated Values, Priors and Posterior Estimates for the Model
Parameters
Parameter Explanation Prior1 Mode [ 5%2 95%2 ]
Alow Entrepreneurs's N(0:90; :010) 0:909 [ 0:798   1:060 ]
tech distribution (level)
d Entrepreneurs's IG(0:025; 0:05) 0:023 [ 0:018   0:028 ]
tech distribution (width) 
 1   1 100 Discount factor Calibrated 0:900 [       ]
h Habit Calibrated 0:900 [       ]
logLss Labor Supply N(2; 0:50) 1:855 [ 1:179   2:542 ]
 Inverse Frisch G(2; 0:50) 0:438 [ 0:291   0:589 ]
 Borrowing Constraint B(0:30; 0:10) 0:268 [ 0:252   0:285 ]
 100 Liquidity Constraint G(0:50; 0:10) 0:072 [ 0:048   0:096 ]
BoY Liquidity over GDP Calibrated 0:025 [       ]
'B Fiscal Rule - Debt Calibrated 0:500 [       ]
'B Fiscal Rule - Output Calibrated 0:130 [       ]
k Capital Tax Rate Calibrated 0:184 [       ]
 l Labor Tax Rate Calibrated 0:223 [       ]
 Share of Capital B(0:30; 0:10) 0:272 [ 0:253   0:291 ]
S" Investment Adj. Costs G(2; 0:50) 2:470 [ 1:842   3:339 ]
p Price Mark-up IG(0:15; 0:05) 0:053 [ 0:042   0:066 ]
p Calvo prices B(0:70; 0:10) 0:603 [ 0:533   0:659 ]
p Indexation Prices B(0:50; 0:15) 0:109 [ 0:049   0:247 ]
w Labor Pref IG(0:15; 0:05) 0:161 [ 0:098   0:261 ]
 Taylor rule - Ination N(1:7; 0:30) 1:764 [ 1:582   1:914 ]
y Taylor rule - Output N(0:125; 0:05) 0:209 [ 0:182   0:237 ]
continued
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Parameter Explanation Prior1 Mode [ 5%2 95%2 ]
R Taylor rule - Persistence B(0:60; 0:20) 0:790 [ 0:757   0:817 ]
ss SS Ination N(0:50; 0:10) 0:786 [ 0:685   0:884 ]
 SS Output Growth N(0:30; 0:05) 0:343 [ 0:276   0:400 ]
q SS Spread G(0:625; 0:15) 0:013 [ 0:001   0:028 ]
p MA(1) Price Mark-up B(0:50; 0:10) 0:444 [ 0:145   0:741 ]
w MA(1) Laboor Pref B(0:50; 0:10) 0:297 [ 0:171   0:406 ]
z AR(1) TFP shock B(0:40; 0:20) 0:153 [ 0:080   0:244 ]
g AR(1) Gov't spending B(0:60; 0:20) 0:983 [ 0:963   0:992 ]
p AR(1) Price Mark-up B(0:60; 0:20) 0:981 [ 0:970   0:988 ]
w AR(1) Labor Pref B(0:60; 0:20) 0:672 [ 0:326   0:928 ]
q AR(1) Financial Spread B(0:60; 0:20) 0:981 [ 0:975   0:986 ]
b AR(1) Intertemporal pref. B(0:40; 0:20) 0:954 [ 0:922   0:981 ]
z Stdev TFP Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:450 [ 0:417   0:483 ]
mp Stdev MP Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:129 [ 0:113   0:15 ]
g Stdev Gov't . Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:320 [ 0:287   0:362 ]
p Stdev Pr. Mark-up Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:225 [ 0:169   0:314 ]
w Stdev Labor Pref Shock IG(0:50; 1) 44:162 [ 41:651   46:787 ]
q Stdev Financial Shock IG(0:50; 1) 4:50 [ 3:89   5:158 ]
b Stdev Preference Shock IG(0:50; 1) 0:031 [ 0:029   0:034 ]
 Stdev Meas Error Spread IG(0:25; 1) 0:435 [ 0:373   0:503 ]
Standard deviations of the shocks are scaled by 100 for the estimation with respect to the model.
1. N stands for Normal, B Beta, G Gamma and IG Inverse-Gamma distribution
2. Posterior percentiles from 3 chains of 100,000 draws generated using a Random walk Metropolis
algorithm.
Acceptance rate 29%. Burning period: initial 20,000 draws. Observations retained: one in every 10
draws.
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Table 5: Priors on Theoretical Moments
Moment Prior Type Prior Mean Prior Std
Var( logXt) N 1.15 0.18
Var( log It) N 16.35 2.63
Var( logCt) N 0.29 0.04
Var(RBt ) N 0.84 0.23
Var(t) N 0.43 0.10
Var(logL) N 10.74 2.36
Var(Spt) - - -
Var( logwt) N 0.20 0.03
E[FGSt] B 0.30 0.05
E[LIQSt] B 0.25 0.10
Prior distributions on the variances of observables are the Normal asymptotic distributions of the
GMM variance estimators, computed on a pre-sample that spans from 1954:Q3 to 1988:Q4. Source:
Haver Analytics. Prior distributions on steady state level of nancing gap share (FGSt) and share of
portfolio liquidations over total nancing gap (PLSt), centered around Compustat sample averages
over a period 1989:Q1 - 2010:Q1. Source: Compustat
Table 6: Compustat Moments - Estimated Model vs. Data
Data Model Median [ 5% 95% ]
E[FGSt] 0:355 0:364 [ 0:349   0:378 ]
E[LIQSt] 0:243 0:267 [ 0:236   0:296 ]
Pr(FG<0) 0:49 0:610 [ 0:586   0:630 ]
Estimated steady state level of nancing gap share (FGSt), share of external nance over nancing
gap (DESt), share of portfolio liquidations over total nancing gap (LIQSt), share of rms that
record negative nancing gaps. Model implied moments are compared with data averages. Source:
Compustat. Sample period: 1989:Q1 to 2010:Q1). Posterior percentiles from 3 chains of 100,000
draws generated using a Random walk Metropolis algorithm. Acceptance rate 31%. Burning period:
initial 20,000 draws. Observations retained: one in every 10 draws.
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Table 7: Model Fit : Standard Deviations
Observables Data Model Prior Mean
Median 5% - 95%
Stdev( logXt) 0.63 0.80 [ 0.69 - 0.93 ] 1.07
Stdev( log It) 2.58 2.41 [ 2.03 - 2.84 ] 4.04
Stdev( logCt) 0.50 0.68 [ 0.59 - 0.78 ] 0.54
Stdev(RBt ) 0.58 0.72 [ 0.42 - 1.24 ] 0.92
Stdev(t) 0.27 0.54 [ 0.40 - 0.77 ] 0.66
Stdev(logLt) 4.75 2.77 [ 1.75 - 4.39 ] 3.28
Stdev(Spt) 0.52 1.11 [ 0.75 - 1.84 ] -
Stdev( logwt) 0.75 0.58 [ 0.49 - 0.67 ] 0.45
Standard deviations of observable variables. Model implied vs. Data and implied prior distribution
mean from Table 5. Source: Haver Analytics. Sample period: 1989Q1 - 2010Q1. Pre-sample for
priors: 1954Q3 - 1988Q4. Posterior percentiles from 3 chains of 100,000 draws generated using a
Random walk Metropolis algorithm. Acceptance rate 31%. Burning period: initial 20,000 draws.
Observations retained: one in every 10 draws.
Table 8: Model Fit : Autocorrelations of Order 1
Observables Data Model
Median 5% - 95%
Corr( logXt;logXt 1) 0.47 0.194 [ 0.003 - 0.382 ]
Corr( log It;log It 1) 0.60 0.239 [ 0.050 - 0.412 ]
Corr( logCt;logCt 1) 0.51 0.140 [ -0.050 - 0.326 ]
Corr(RBt ; R
B
t 1) 0.93 0.956 [ 0.902 - 0.981 ]
Corr(t; t 1) 0.52 0.782 [ 0.621 - 0.889 ]
Corr(logLt; logLt 1) 0.93 0.927 [ 0.845 - 0.968 ]
Corr(Spt; Spt 1) 0.81 0.742 [ 0.455 - 0.899 ]
Corr( logwt;logwt 1) 0.035 0.312 [ 0.112 - 0.492 ]
Autocorrelation of Order 1 of Observable Variables. Model implied vs. Data Data source: Haver
Analytics, Sample period 1989Q1 - 2010Q1. Posterior percentiles from 3 chains of 100,000 draws
generated using a Random walk Metropolis algorithm. Acceptance rate 31%. Burning period: initial
20,000 draws. Observations retained: one in every 10 draws.
* The autocorrelation of real wages computed over a sample that ends in 2007:Q4 and excludes the
last recession is 0.15.
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Compustat Capital Expenditure and Flow of Funds Corporate Investment
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Figure 1: Comparison of Capital Expenditure of Compustat Firms (blue dashed line) and Flow of
Funds Corporate Capital Expenditure (black solid line), in millions of dollars. Sources: Compustat
and Flow of Funds Table F.102. Sample period 1989Q1 - 2010Q1.
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Figure 2: CAPXt: Total Capital Expenditure of U.S. rms in Compustat. Panel A (top) reports
the raw data (blue dashed line) against the seasonally-adjusted series (black solid line), in millions
of dollars. Panel B shows the raw data (blue dashed line) against the extracted trend (black solid
line). Seasonal adjustment and trend extraction performed using the Census X12 procedure. Source:
Compustat. Sample period 1989Q1 - 2010Q1.
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FGS − Financing Gap Share net of Working Capital
 
 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
NBER Recessions
Original
Adjusted
FGS − Financing Gap ShareFGS − Financing Gap Share net of Working Capital
 
 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
NBER Recessions
Original
Trend
Figure 3: FGSt: Financing Gap Share. Panel A (top) reports the raw data (blue dashed line) against
the seasonally-adjusted series (black solid line). Panel B shows the raw data (blue dashed line)
against the extracted trend (black solid line). Seasonal adjustment and trend extraction performed
using the Census X12 procedure. Source: Compustat. Sample period 1989Q1 - 2010Q1.
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WKS − Working Capital Share of Financial Gap
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Figure 4: WKSt: Working capital nancing needs as a share of total Financing Gap. Panel A (top)
reports the raw data (blue dashed line) against the seasonally-adjusted series (black solid line). Panel
B shows the raw data (blue dashed line) against the extracted trend (black solid line). Seasonal
adjustment and trend extraction performed using the Census X12 procedure. Source: Compustat.
Sample period 1989Q1 - 2010Q1.
Financing Gap Share of Capital Expenditures
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Figure 5: Financing Gap Share, as computed in equation (5) (black solid line) for the aggregate of
U.S. and Canadian corporations. The series is compared to results obtained using Chari and Kehoe
(2009)'s methdology applied to annual data (red dashed line) and quarterly data (blue dashed line).
Source: Compustat. Sample period 1989Q1 - 2010Q1.
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LIQS − Share of Financial Gap Funded with Portfolio Liquidations
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Figure 6: LIQSt: Share of Financing Gap funded through portfolio liquidations and changes in cash
reserves. Panel A (top) reports the raw data (blue dashed line) against the seasonally-adjusted series
(black solid line). Panel B shows the raw data (blue dashed line) against the extracted trend (black
solid line). Seasonal adjustment and trend extraction performed using the Census X12 procedure.
Source: Compustat. Sample period 1989Q1 - 2010Q1.
Figure 7: Distribution of Relative Price of Investment Technologies across Entrepreneurs
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Impulse Response Functions −  Financial Shock at Posterior Mode
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation nancial shock. The dashed lines represent
90 percent posterior probability bands around the posterior median.
Impulse Response Functions −  Financial Shock − Sticky vs. Flexible Wages
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Figure 9: Impulse response functions to a one standard deviation nancial shock. Comparison
between sticky wages (black dashed line) and exible wages (blue solid line). Impulse responses are
computed at the posterior modes.
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Model Spread vs. High Yield Series
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Figure 10: Corporate Bond Spreads - Data vs. Model, in percentage points. Source for Spread data:
Haver Analytics. Sample period 1989Q1 - 2010Q1.
Historical Decomposition − Financial Shock and Output Growth
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Figure 11: Quarterly output growth in the data (black solid line) and in the model (red dahsed
line) with only nancial shocks. Source for GDP data: Haver Analytics. Sample period 1989Q1 -
2010Q1.
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Historical Decomposition Last Recession − Output Growth
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Figure 12: Quarterly GDP growth in the data (blue lines) compared to Kalman-smoothed series
from benchmark model estimates (red dashed lines), excluding nancial shocks (top-left), TFP
shocks (top-right panel), government spending shocks (bottom-left panel) and monetary policy
shocks (bottom-right panel). Source for GDP data: Haver Analytics.
Historical Decomposition of Shocks
FINANCIAL SHOCK
2006.5 2007 2007.5 2008 2008.5 2009 2009.5 2010
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
20
TFP SHOCK
2006.5 2007 2007.5 2008 2008.5 2009 2009.5 2010
−0.5
0
0.5
1
GOVT SHOCK
2006.5 2007 2007.5 2008 2008.5 2009 2009.5 2010
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
MP SHOCK
2006.5 2007 2007.5 2008 2008.5 2009 2009.5 2010
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 13: Historical decomposition of last recession into smoothed shocks: nancial shocks (top-left
panel), TFP shocks (top-right panel), government spending shocks (bottom-left panel) and monetary
policy shocks (bottom-right panel).
